The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2426-2428 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2426-2428.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भावपक्षप्रसिद्ध्यर्थमुच्यते यच्च साधनम् ।
निराकृतेऽपि ते तस्मिन्नाभावः सिद्ध्यति स्वयम् ॥ २४२६ ॥
तद्भावसाधनेऽप्यस्ते न स्यात्तद्भावनिश्चयः ।
तद्भावविनिवृत्तेस्तु तन्मात्रान्नास्ति निश्चयः ॥ २४२७ ॥
निवृत्तावपि मानानामर्थाभावाप्रसिद्धितः ।
तेनैतावद्भवेन्नास्ति पक्षसिद्धिर्द्वयोरपि ॥ २४२८ ॥

bhāvapakṣaprasiddhyarthamucyate yacca sādhanam |
nirākṛte'pi te tasminnābhāvaḥ siddhyati svayam || 2426 ||
tadbhāvasādhane'pyaste na syāttadbhāvaniścayaḥ |
tadbhāvavinivṛttestu tanmātrānnāsti niścayaḥ || 2427 ||
nivṛttāvapi mānānāmarthābhāvāprasiddhitaḥ |
tenaitāvadbhavennāsti pakṣasiddhirdvayorapi || 2428 ||

If certain proofs are adduced in support of the view that there is an author of the Vedas,—if these proofs are refuted, it does not necessarily follow that there is no such author. In fact on the refutation of the proof of his existence, what follows is that there is no certainty regarding his existence; similarly the mere setting aside of the idea of his existence is not enough to bring about any certainty at all.—As a matter of fact, even on the cessation of the means of cognition, there is no certainty regarding the nonexistence of the thing concerned; hence all that it can prove is that there is no certainty regarding either of the two views.—(2426-2428)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 2100, that—“when the proofs adduced to prove the existence of such an Author are refuted, the absence of such a one follows as a matter of course”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2426-2428 above]

When a certain proof is adduced for the purpose of bringing. about certainty regarding a certain thing,—if that proof is refuted,—all that will

follow would be that there would be no certainty relating to it; it would not follow that the thing itself does not exist. Because on the cessation of the Means of Cognition, the object of Cognition does not cease,—as has been explained above—on the basis of its being the Means or the Pervader.

Aste’—on being refuted.

All that can be asserted with reason is that ‘neither of the two views is proved’; the particle ‘iti’ has to be added, after ‘nāsti—(2426-2428)

The same idea is further strengthened by means of an example:—[see verse 2429 next]

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