Verse 2406

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवंचापौरुषेयोऽपि (सम्यग्ज्ञाने)निबन्धनम् ।
वेदः सन्तिष्ठते नैव तद्वृथैवास्य कल्पना ॥ २४०६ ॥

evaṃcāpauruṣeyo'pi (samyagjñāne)nibandhanam |
vedaḥ santiṣṭhate naiva tadvṛthaivāsya kalpanā || 2406 ||

Thus, even though not the work of a person, the Veda cannot be the source of right cognition; hence the assumption of it is entirely futile.—(2406)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged:—“What is meant by us is, not that the character of being a product is the cause of wrong cognition only, but that the said character alone is the cause of the wrong cognition; there is no other cause for it; we do not assert that Right Cognition can never be brought about by what is a Product. Everything that is a product is not equally regarded by us as being the cause of Wrong Cognition; by virtue of which, the Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, all that is not-product would be the source of Right Cognition. What is meant by us is that Products being multifarious, it is only some Products that are the source of Wrong Cognition,—e.g. jaundice, etc.—while some are the source of Right Cognition,—e.g. the whole lot of undiseased sense-organs. If it were not so, then, on finding that some products like Ice are the source of cold,—it might be presumed by implication that warmth which is contrary.to cold is due to something that is not a Product. As a matter of fact, however, this is not so.—Thus, inasmuch as we do not deny the fact of the Product being the source of Right Cognition, Smoke does remain the means of Right Cognition (of Fire)”.

Anticipating this argument, the Author answers it in the following—[see verse 2406 above]

If the character of being a Product were the cause of both Rightness and Wrongness,—then the absence of that character would mean the absence of both Right and Wrong Cognition; consequently the fact of the Veda not being a product could not be a ground for its being a source of Right Cognition; as that is not a cause of this latter; hence the qualification—‘not being a product’—as applied to the Probans, is useless.

The following might be urged—“By the qualification—‘not being the work of man’, what is meant is not the ‘Positive-Negative’ Premiss, but a purely negative Premiss; the sense being that—being a Product, which is the contrary of the Probans (‘not being the work of man’), is concomitant with ‘falsity’, which is the contrary of the Probandum (‘Truthfulness’),—because falsity is found in the words of man only—hence wherever there is the character of not being a Product, which is contrary to that with which Falsity is invariably concomitant,—there, the character of not being a Product,—which is negatively concomitant with, falsity—being negatived, its concomitant, Falsity, also becomes negatived; and thus it would follow that what is not a Product asserts what is true; and as thus the desired conclusion -would be got even without the affirmative premiss, any statement of such a Premiss would be useless

True; this is so. If the concomitance between the two contraries is admitted. But it is not admitted. For instance, there would be concomitance between the two contraries of the Probandum, if against the Probans, which is contrary to the Probandum, there were a sublative cognition. There is, however, no such sublative cognition. Mere non-perception does not prove non-existence; as it is not a conclusive proof for non-existence.

The following might be urged—“Being a Product is the contrary of not-being a Product; in the former we find falsity, whence it follows by implication that what is not a Product is devoid of falsity”.

This is not right. From seeing something in one place, it does not follow that it does not exist elsewhere; because one and the same thing is found to be concomitant with mutually contradictory things. For instance, the single character of non-eternality is found to be concomitant with what is produced by effort and also what is not so produced; and the mere fact of non-eternality being found in what is produced by effort, cannot lead to the conclusion that it does not exist in what is not produced by effort.

Further, if the mere fact of falsity being sometimes found in what is a Product were to mean that the two are invariably concomitant, then it might be that truthfulness being found in words proceeding from men,—truthfulness and proceeding from men may be regarded as invariable concomitants;—and consequently, on the cessation of the character of being a product, falsity should cease,—as also Truthfulness should cease; so that the mere fact of not being the work of a Person does not prove truthfulness-Enough of this discussion.—(2406)