Verse 2346-2350

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ततश्च गम्यतां व्यक्तममृषा वैदिकं वचः ।
स्वार्थे वक्रनपेक्षत्वात्पदार्थे पदबुद्धिवत् ॥ २३४६ ॥
तत्कृतः प्रत्य(यः सम्यग्यदयं नित्यवाक्यजः ।
वाक्यस्वरूपविषयप्रत्ययस्तद्भवो यथा ॥ २३४७ ॥
चोदनावाक्यजनितप्रत्ययस्य प्रमाणता ।
आप्तवाक्यसमुद्भूतप्रत्ययस्येव सिद्ध्यति ॥ २३४८ ॥
यतोऽयं प्रत्ययस्तावदनाप्ताकृतवाक्यजः ।
कालावस्थादिभेदेऽपि विसंवादोऽस्य नास्ति यत् ) ॥ २३४९ ॥
प्रमाणेऽवप्रमाणे च स्थिते वेदे शिष्याचार्यपरम्परा ।
(अनादिः कल्प्यमानाऽपि) निर्दोषत्वाय कल्पते ॥ २३५० ॥

tataśca gamyatāṃ vyaktamamṛṣā vaidikaṃ vacaḥ |
svārthe vakranapekṣatvātpadārthe padabuddhivat || 2346 ||
tatkṛtaḥ pratya(yaḥ samyagyadayaṃ nityavākyajaḥ |
vākyasvarūpaviṣayapratyayastadbhavo yathā || 2347 ||
codanāvākyajanitapratyayasya pramāṇatā |
āptavākyasamudbhūtapratyayasyeva siddhyati || 2348 ||
yato'yaṃ pratyayastāvadanāptākṛtavākyajaḥ |
kālāvasthādibhede'pi visaṃvādo'sya nāsti yat ) || 2349 ||
pramāṇe'vapramāṇe ca sthite vede śiṣyācāryaparamparā |
(anādiḥ kalpyamānā'pi) nirdoṣatvāya kalpate || 2350 ||

“Thus then, it should be understood clearly that the assertion in the Veda is not false (unreliable);—because in the expression of its meaning, it is not dependent upon a speaker,—just like the word in the expression of the word-meaning—(2346).

“The cognitions derived from the Veda must be right,—because they arise from the eternal sentence,—like the cognition of the sentence itself.—The arguments detailed before are all applicable here”.—[Ślokavārtika-sambandhākṣepa, 2].—(2347).

“The cognition brought about by the Vedic injunction must be reliable; (a) because it is produced by causes free from all defects;—like the ideas produced by the inferential indicative, or by the assertion of trustworthy persons, or by perception;—(b) also because it is produced by an assertion which does not emanate from an unreliable person, and because it is free from sublation at all times and places,—like the idea produced by the assertion of a reliable person”—[Ślokavārtika, sutra 2, 184-185]. (2348-2349)

“It being thus established that the Veda is authoritative and reliable,—the longstanding beginningless line of teachers and pupils that has been assumed tends to prove that it is free from defects—(2350)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following Texts, the whole subject-matter of the Context is summed up by the Mīmāṃsaka and supported by arguments:—[see verses 2346-2350 above]

That which produces a cognition, independently of the person using it, with regard to a certain thing, cannot be false in respect of that thing; e.g. the Word as bringing about the cognition of its own meaning;—the Vedic Sentence produces the cognition of its meaning, independently of any speaker in the shape of its Author;—hence there is apprehension of a condition contrary to the wider condition;—‘falsity’ being ‘less wide’ than ‘being productive of cognitions through dependence upon the composing Person’, which latter thus is the ‘vyāpaka’, the ‘wider condition’,—the ‘viruddha’, ‘contrary’, of this would be ‘being productive of cognitions independently of the composing person’; and this latter condition is apprehended in the case of the Veda.

‘Like the Word in the expression of its meaning’;—this is meant to show that Words are productive of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things; and the ‘cognition produced by the word’ is not meant to be the Corroborative Instance; the words themselves being that instance.—Thus then, in the argument, Word is the Minor Term; and what is sought to be proved in regard to it is its non-falsity on account of its being the cause of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things -consequently, the Corroborative Instance also should have exactly the same character; otherwise the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

There is another argument, which is formulated as follows:—That Cognition which is brought about by an eternal sentence must be in conformity with the real state of things and hence right;—just like the cognition of the verbal form of the sentence itself;—the cognition of the fact of the performance of Agnihotra, etc. leading to Heaven is produced by the eternal sentence;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The eternality (of the Veda) has been proved in detail already; hence the Probans in this argument cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’.

‘The Cognit ion brought about by the Vedic Injunction, etc. etc.’—This has been already explained.

There are two other arguments, formulated as follows:—The Cognition that is not produced by the assertion of an unreliable Person,—and also that which is free from contradiction (sublation, annulment) throughout the variations of time, place and personalities, must be reliable,—like the Cognition produced by the assertion of a reliable person;—of this same kind is the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunctive Sentence;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

The first of the Reasons adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because it has been proved at great length that the Veda is not the work of a Person.

Nor can the second Reason be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because, as has been explained in the following passage—‘The idea brought about by the assertion—“Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices”—is not an uncertain one; that is, it is not in the form that—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion that such is not the actual case; the idea in question (that Heaven follows the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong’—(Śabara-Bhāṣya on 1. 1. 2, Translation, Page 5).

From all this it becomes established that the Veda is reliable, by itself, being as it is, the basis of all ideas of Dharma and allied matters;—and like Light, it is a trustworthy source of knowledge for all men. Hence, it becomes established that all such theories as ‘all that exists is mere Idea’, which have been propounded by the Buddhists and others, cannot be right.—(2346-2350)