Verse 2320-2321

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कार्या चैन्द्रियकत्वादौ किंवस्त्विति निरूपणा ।
व्यक्तिभ्योऽनन्यनानात्वभेदाभेदेषु च स्फुटा ॥ २३२० ॥
तत्रासाधारणासिद्धसाध्यहीनसपक्षताःक्षता ।
विकल्पितानुसारेण वक्तव्या वाद्यपेक्षयाचाद्यपेक्षया ॥ २३२१ ॥

kāryā caindriyakatvādau kiṃvastviti nirūpaṇā |
vyaktibhyo'nanyanānātvabhedābhedeṣu ca sphuṭā || 2320 ||
tatrāsādhāraṇāsiddhasādhyahīnasapakṣatāḥkṣatā |
vikalpitānusāreṇa vaktavyā vādyapekṣayācādyapekṣayā || 2321 ||

“In regard to amenability to the senses and the rest (that have been cited by the opponent), it has to be clearly ascertained what it really is; (a) is it the same as the individual (things in which it subsists)? Or (b) is it something different from them?—[And if it is different from the individuals]—(c) Is it distinct with each individual? Or (d) one and the same with all?—Under all these, according as the alternative that may be accepted by the other party, the reason would be subject (respectively) to the fallacies of (a) being ‘too specific’, (b) being ‘inadmissible’, (c) and ‘having the corroborative instance devoid of the probandum’.—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 346-348].—(2320-2321)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Mīmāṃsaka puts forward another objection against the Probans and the Probandum,—through another alternative.—[see verses 2320-2321 above]

‘And the rest’—includes non-eternality.

An examination is to be made as to the exact nature of the said ‘amenability to the senses’: (a) Is it the same as the Individuals? (the individual things in which it subsists)?—Or (b) is it something different from them?—and, if it is different from them, it has to be examined whether these different amenabilities are (c) different with each individual object? or (d) one and the same with all?

(a) If the ‘amenability to sense’ is the same as the individuals, the Probans is ‘too specific’; as there can be no ‘negation’ of individual; and like its own form, one Individual, would not be present in another Individual [so that there could be no concomitance, negative or positive, of it].

(b) and (c) If it is different from the Individuals,—as such difference is not admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka, whether it be different or the same in regard to each individual, it would, in either case, be ‘Inadmissible’.

It is for this reason that the defect in the fourth alternative (d)—whereby the ‘amenability’ is different from the Individuals, but the same in all—has not been separately mentioned. Because there would be room for it only if the difference were admitted.

In regard to ‘non-eternality’ (which is another Reason put forward by the Opponent, against the expressiveness of words),—if it is different from the Individuals, the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, it is non-different from them, the Instance would be certainly devoid of the Probandum; because one Individual can never be present in another Individual.—(2320-2321)