Verse 2313-2314

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथास्मदिष्टः पक्षः स्यात्स्वयमेतद्द्वयं तव ।
शब्दमात्रमथोच्येत शब्दत्वं वस्तथासति ॥ २३१३ ॥
अनित्यं तच्च सर्वेषां नित्यमिष्टं विरुध्यते ।
यत्किञ्चिदिह सामान्यं नित्यं सर्वेण कल्प्यते ॥ २३१४ ॥

athāsmadiṣṭaḥ pakṣaḥ syātsvayametaddvayaṃ tava |
śabdamātramathocyeta śabdatvaṃ vastathāsati || 2313 ||
anityaṃ tacca sarveṣāṃ nityamiṣṭaṃ virudhyate |
yatkiñcidiha sāmānyaṃ nityaṃ sarveṇa kalpyate || 2314 ||

“If then, your ‘subject’ or ‘minor term’ consists of the śabda as postulated by us, then, both these fallacies become applicable to you (who do not admit of any such śabda as held by us).—If mere śabda (in general, without any qualification) were asserted as the ‘subject’ of your reasoning, then, it would mean that for you, the universal ‘śabda’ itself is non-eternal; and such a view would be contrary to the view accepted by all men that the universal is always eternal; in one form or the other, the ‘universal’ is regarded by every one as eternal”.—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 321-323].—(2313-2314)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

We, Mīmāṃsakas, hold that ‘Śabda’ consists only in the Letters ‘Ga’ and the rest, it is not anything apart from these;—and if this is the Śabda which the Buddhist and others make the ‘Subject’ of their Proposition, then both these fallacies—the Proposition having the exact nature of its Subject unknown and the Reason having no basis—would befall them.

If mere ‘Śabda’ were asserted—i.e. as the subject of the Proposition,—then for you the universal ‘Śabda’ would itself be non-eternal;—the phrase ‘be non-eternal’ is to be supplied. Because the epithet ‘mere’ means the exclusion of all particular features, what else—apart from the Universal—could it be that would be ‘mere Śabda’? Thus by implication your proposition would be declaring the non-eternality of the Universal ‘Śabda’ itself.

‘Be it so, what then?’

That cannot be right; as ‘such a view would be contrary, etc. etc.—for instance, the Buddhists themselves, who postulate the Exclusion, ‘Apoha, of others’, have declared that ‘it is the Universal that stands’, So that the view now put forth would involve the contradiction of what has been admitted by them.

This is what is shown in the words—‘In one form or the other, etc, etc,’—In whatever form the ‘Universal’ has been postulated by philosophers, in accordance with their respective doctrines, it is held, by all parties, to be eternal. If it were not so, then, like the Individuals, each Universal, appearing after the other, would become intermingled; and the very character of the ‘Universal’ would become lost.—(2313-2314)