The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2267-2269 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2267-2269.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विद्यमानस्य चार्थस्य दृष्टं न ग्रहणं क्वचित् ।
न त्वत्यन्तासतोऽस्तित्वं कांश्चित्प्रत्युपपद्यते ॥ २२६७ ॥
विरुद्धौ सदसद्भावौ न स्यातामेकवस्तुनि ।
नच तुल्यं विरोधित्वं ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वयोरपि ॥ २२६८ ॥
ज्ञानं हि पुरुषाधारं तद्भेदान्न विरुध्यते ।
पुरुषान्तरसंस्थं च न (ना ?) ज्ञानं तेन वार्यते ॥ २२६९ ॥

vidyamānasya cārthasya dṛṣṭaṃ na grahaṇaṃ kvacit |
na tvatyantāsato'stitvaṃ kāṃścitpratyupapadyate || 2267 ||
viruddhau sadasadbhāvau na syātāmekavastuni |
naca tulyaṃ virodhitvaṃ jñātājñātatvayorapi || 2268 ||
jñānaṃ hi puruṣādhāraṃ tadbhedānna virudhyate |
puruṣāntarasaṃsthaṃ ca na (nā ?) jñānaṃ tena vāryate || 2269 ||

“It is often found that though a certain thing exists, it is not known; but it is never found by any person that what is absolutely non-existent is existent; because existence and non, existence being mutually contradictory, cannot belong to the same thing. There is no such contradiction between being known and being not known; because knowledge subsists in the cognisant person; and as personalities vary, there is no incompatibility; hence the absence of knowledge, as residing in one person, does not become excluded (by the presence of knowledge, in another person).—[Ślokavārtika-samhandhākṣepaparihāra, 33-35].—(2267-2269)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent—It is not possible for the same thing to have the two contradictory characters of being existent and being non-existent? similarly it cannot be right for the same thing to be both known and not known. If there is no incompatibility between these two, why should there be incompatibility between existence and non-existence?

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2267-2269 above]

It is incompatible for two mutually contradictory properties to reside in the same thing,—not when they reside in different things. As regards being known and being not known,—these reside in different persons; hence there can be no incongruity in this. The same cannot be said of existence and non-existence, which have been held (by the Opponent) to reside in the same thing (the Connection). Such, in brief, is the sense of the argument.—(2267-2269)

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