Verse 2208

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्भावभाविता चात्र शक्त्यस्तित्वावबोधिनी ।
श्रोत्रशक्तिवदेवेष्टा बुद्धिस्तत्र हि संहृता ॥ २२०८ ॥

tadbhāvabhāvitā cātra śaktyastitvāvabodhinī |
śrotraśaktivadeveṣṭā buddhistatra hi saṃhṛtā || 2208 ||

“All that the fact of one thing appearing only when the other is there indicates is the presence (in the latter) of a certain potency (or capacity),—just like the potency in the auditory organ; and there the presumption has been allowed to rest.”—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words—127-128].—(2208)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent:—It is clearly known that Sound is the effect of the articulations,—from the fact that it appears only when these are there,—just as, on similar grounds, the sprout is known to be the Effect of the Seed.

In this latter case, it is found that the Sprout is seen only when the seed has been there, and from this it is concluded that the Sprout is the effect of the Seed,—in the same manner, Sounds are perceived only when the articulations have been there; why then, should Sound be not regarded as the effect produced, by the articulations? Specially because the said fact is the sole basis for anything being regarded as the effect of something else.

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2208 above]:

There is hearing of Sound when the Auditory Organ is there; but this fact of the Sound being heard only when the Organ is there does not lead to the inference that the Auditory Organ possesses the potency to produce Sound; all that can he inferred is that it has the potency or capacity of apprehending it. Similarly, in the case in question, all that the fact of Sound being heard only when the articulations are there can justify is the inference that these articulations possess a certain potency;—it cannot indicate the presence in them of the capacity to produce Sound; as the said fact is concomitant only with the presence of the capacity in general,—and not with any particular kind of Capacity. Hence in the proving of the particular kind of Capacity, the said fact, if cited as the Probans, cannot but be ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive’.—This is what is meant by the text.

Question:—How then is there the idea of the particular Capacity in the ‘Embellishment’?

Answer:—‘There the Presumption has been allowed to rest.’—That is, Recognition having established the Eternality of the Word-Sound, the Presumption based upon the fact of the well-known phenomenon of Hearing not being otherwise explicable has been made—by the author of the Bhāṣya (Śabara)—to rest in the particular embellishment; and the capacity of this embellishment has not been inferred merely from the fact of concomitance (of the Embellishment and the Hearing).—(2208)