The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2167 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2167.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

संस्कृतासंस्कृतत्वे न शब्दैकत्वेन सिद्ध्यतः ।
एकावस्थाभ्युपेतौ च सर्वैर्ज्ञायेत वा नवा ॥ २१६७ ॥

saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtatve na śabdaikatvena siddhyataḥ |
ekāvasthābhyupetau ca sarvairjñāyeta vā navā || 2167 ||

The word-sound being one, it cannot be regarded as both embellished and not embellished; so that only one condition should be admitted,—no matter whether it be cognised, or not cognised, by all.—(2167)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[The following might be urged]—It has been asserted (in Text 2157) that ‘if Sound were embellished, it would be heard by all’; but this incongruity does not arise, because even a single Sound may be embellished for one man, while not-embellished for another; just as the same woman, through difference in relationship, may be mother to one and daughter to another person.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2167above]

The Sound being one, the two conditions of being ‘embellished’ and ‘not embellished’ cannot belong to it, at the same time; because the condition cannot differ from the conditioned; so that, as the conditioned ‘Sound’ is one only, its condition (embellished or otherwise) must be one only.—As regards the case of one and the same woman being both Mother and Daughter,—there it is the name only that differs, not the thing itself; while in the case in question, the difference is not merely in name, as the Sound is there as equally perceptible by all men; whence there could not be perception and non-perception at the same time; and mere change in name cannot deprive a thing of its innate capacity for effective action.

It might be said that the nature of Sound is such that it is perceptible by certain restricted persons only,—so that there would be nothing incongruous in its perception and non-perception at the same time, by reason of the capacity of the particular persons concerned.

This cannot be so; if it were so, then if Sound is not perceived by a man at one time, it would never be perceived by him;—but such is not the ease.

Hence, in order to preserve the one-mss of the Sound, only one condition should be accepted—either the embellished or the unembellished.

Question:—What would be the result of this?

Answer:—‘So that only one condition, etc. etc.’—(2167)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: