Verse 2121-2130

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

देशकालादिभिन्नाश्च गोशब्दव्यक्तिबुद्धयः ।
समानविषयाः सर्वा नवा नानार्थगोचराः ॥ २१२१ ॥
गौरित्युत्पद्यमानत्वात्सम्प्रत्युत्पन्नबुद्धिवत् ।
गोशब्दबुद्ध्या ह्यस्तन्या गोशब्दोऽयं प्रकाशितः ॥ २१२२ ॥
गोशब्दविषयत्वेन यथैवाद्य प्रसूतया ।
इयं वा तं विजानाति तद्धेतोः पूर्वबुद्धिवत् ॥ २१२३ ॥
उभे वाऽप्येकविषये भवेतामेकबुद्धिवत् ।
देशकालादिभिन्ना वा समस्ता गोत्वबुद्धयः ॥ २१२४ ॥
एकगोशब्दजन्याः स्युर्गोधीत्वादेकबुद्धिवत् ।
ह्यस्तनोच्चारणो वाऽपि गोशब्दोऽद्यापि विद्यते ॥ २१२५ ॥
गोशब्दज्ञानगम्यत्वादद्योच्चारितशब्दवत् ।
गौरिति श्रूयमाणोऽद्य ह्योऽपि शब्दो मया श्रुतः ॥ २१२६ ॥
हेतोः पूर्वोदितादेव ह्य उच्चारितशब्दवत् ।
शब्दो वा वाचको यावान्स्थिरोऽसौ दीर्घकालभाक् ॥ २१२७ ॥
सम्बन्धानुभवापेक्षज्ञेयज्ञानप्रवर्त्तनात् ।
य ईदृक्स स्थिरो दृष्टो धूमसामान्यभागवत् ॥ २१२८ ॥
अस्थिरस्तु न सम्बन्धज्ञानापेक्षोऽवबोधकः ।
तादात्विकनिमित्तत्वाद्दीपविद्युत्प्रकाशवत् ॥ २१२९ ॥
शब्दानित्यत्वपक्षोऽतः सर्वैरेभिर्विरुध्यते ।
अनुमानैर्दृढैः सिद्धैर्नित्याः शब्दास्ततः स्थिताः ॥ २१३० ॥

deśakālādibhinnāśca gośabdavyaktibuddhayaḥ |
samānaviṣayāḥ sarvā navā nānārthagocarāḥ || 2121 ||
gaurityutpadyamānatvātsampratyutpannabuddhivat |
gośabdabuddhyā hyastanyā gośabdo'yaṃ prakāśitaḥ || 2122 ||
gośabdaviṣayatvena yathaivādya prasūtayā |
iyaṃ vā taṃ vijānāti taddhetoḥ pūrvabuddhivat || 2123 ||
ubhe vā'pyekaviṣaye bhavetāmekabuddhivat |
deśakālādibhinnā vā samastā gotvabuddhayaḥ || 2124 ||
ekagośabdajanyāḥ syurgodhītvādekabuddhivat |
hyastanoccāraṇo vā'pi gośabdo'dyāpi vidyate || 2125 ||
gośabdajñānagamyatvādadyoccāritaśabdavat |
gauriti śrūyamāṇo'dya hyo'pi śabdo mayā śrutaḥ || 2126 ||
hetoḥ pūrvoditādeva hya uccāritaśabdavat |
śabdo vā vācako yāvānsthiro'sau dīrghakālabhāk || 2127 ||
sambandhānubhavāpekṣajñeyajñānapravarttanāt |
ya īdṛksa sthiro dṛṣṭo dhūmasāmānyabhāgavat || 2128 ||
asthirastu na sambandhajñānāpekṣo'vabodhakaḥ |
tādātvikanimittatvāddīpavidyutprakāśavat || 2129 ||
śabdānityatvapakṣo'taḥ sarvairebhirvirudhyate |
anumānairdṛḍhaiḥ siddhairnityāḥ śabdāstataḥ sthitāḥ || 2130 ||

“(1) The notions of the individual cow-word, though diverse in points place, time, etc., must all envisage the same cow-word,—they do not envisage several words,—because they always appear in the form ‘cow’,—like the notion of ‘cow’ that appears at the present moment.—(2) The notion of the cow-word that appeared yesterday envisaged this same cow-word,—because it envisaged the cow-word,—like the notion appearing to-day.—(3) This notion envisages that cow-word,—for the same said reason,—like the previous notion.—(4) Both notions envisage the same cow-word,—like the single notion.—(5) All notions of the ‘cow’, divergent as regards place, time, etc., are brought about by the same cow-word,—because they are notions of the ‘cow’,—like the single notion.—(6) The cow-word that was uttered yesterday must exist today also,—because it is envisaged by the cognition of the cow-word,—like the same word uttered today.—(7) The cow-word that is heard today was heard by me yesterday also; for the aforesaid reason,—like the word uttered yesterday.—(8) All such words as are expressive must be regarded as lasting a long time,—because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships,—everything that does this has been found to be permanent,—like the ‘universal’ aspect of smoke.—(9) That which denotes things through the apprehension of relationships cannot be evanescent,—because it must have its relationship continuing till the time of use,—like the light of the lamp and the lightning.—Thus the idea of word-sound being non-eternal is annulled by all these inferences which must be admitted to be perfectly sound. Consequently it becomes established that words are eternal.”—(2121-2130)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Mīmāṃsaka next proceeds to show how the Proposition of the Buddhist (regarding Veda being non-eternal) is annulled by Inferences;—[see verses 2121-2130 above]

(1) The notions that appear in connection with the individual words ‘Cow,’—though divergent through diversities of place, time, quick, middling and prolonged, and so forth,—all envisage the same word,—they do not envisage diverse words,—because they all appear in the same form ‘Cow’,—like the notion of the cow-word appearing at the present time.

“Or, (2) Whenever there is notion of the word. ‘Cow’, it must be taken as referring to the word ‘Cow’ appearing to-day,—because it envisages the word ‘Cow’,—like the word appearing to-day;—the notion of the word appearing yesterday envisages the same word.—This is thus a Reason based upon the nature of things.

“Or, (3) The ‘subject’ of the Inference may be the notion of the word appearing to-day,—‘being envisaged by the notion of the word that appeared yesterday’ is the Probandum,—‘because it envisages the word’ is the Probans;—and ‘the notion of the word appearing yesterday’ is the Corroborative Instance.—This is the argument formulated in the words.—‘This notion envisages, etc. etc.’—‘this notion’ stands for the notion appearing to-day.—That’—the word ‘Cow’ apprehended by the Cognition of the word ‘Cow’ that appeared yesterday.—‘For the same said reason’—i.e. ‘because it envisages the word Cow

“Or, (4) Both—the notions appearing to-day and yesterday—envisage the same word,—because both envisage the word ‘Cow’;—like the notion of the single word ‘Cow’.—This argument is expressed in the words ‘Both, etc. etc.’. The Reason has not been stated in detail, as it is well-known.

“Or, (5) All notions of the universal ‘Cow’,—though divergent in regard to diversities of place, time, etc.—are produced by the same word ‘Cow’,—because they are notions of the Cow,—like the notion of the single Cow.—In the previous argument, the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term) consisted of ‘the notions envisaging the word ‘Cow’,—‘envisaging the same object’ being the Probandum; while in the present argument, the notions envisaging the universal ‘Cow’ form the Minor Term,—and ‘beng produced by the same word Cow’ is the Probandum;—this is the difference between the two arguments.

“(6) The compound ‘hyastanoccāraṇa’ means ‘that which had its utterance yesterday’;—this mentions the Minor Term; ‘existing to-day’ is the Probandum. The rest is easily understood.

“(7) The word ‘Cow’ that is heard to-day is the Minor Term;—‘was heard yesterday’ is the Probandum.—‘Aforesaid’,—i.e. ‘because it is apprehended by the Cognition of the word Cow’, is the Probans.

“Or, (8) ‘all such words as are expressive’ is the Minor Term;—their ‘lasting for a longtime’ is the Probandum;—and ‘because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships’ is the Probans.—In the compound ‘sambandhānubhavā, etc.’ ‘sambandhānubhāpekṣam’ qualifies ‘jñeyajñanapravartanam’;—‘should be regarded as lasting’; ‘for a long time’ qualifies ‘lasting’. The ‘lasting character’ meant here is in regard to time, not in regard to place, as in the case of mountains;—this is what is intended to be indicated by the qualifying term ‘for a long time’.—‘Like the universal aspect of Smoke’ is the Corroborative Instance; the ‘specific individuality’ of things cannot have any continuity of existence or concomitance, hence it is the ‘universal aspect’ alone that can serve as the Corroborative Instance.

“(9) ‘Cannot be evanescent’;—this states the same argument negatively.—‘Because it must have, etc. etc.’.—‘Tādātvika’—till that time, i.e. till the time of use,—its ‘nimitta’,—relationship—should continue.”—(2121-2130)

The following objection is raised—In this way, the Jar and such things also may be asserted to be one only. For instance, all notions of the individual Jar, though diverse through divergence of Place, Time, etc. must be regarded as envisaging one and the same thing, and not as envisaging several things,—because it appears in the form of ‘Jar’,—like the notion of the Jar appearing a.t the present moment; and so forth. As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouched for by perception. Hence all the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as False (Fallacious).

The answer to this objection (from the Mīmāṃsaka) is as follows:—[see verses 2131-2132 next]