The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2119-2120 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2119-2120.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ज्वालादेः क्षणिकत्वेऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञेति चेन्न तत् ।
तत्र हि प्रत्यभिज्ञेयं सामान्यं नित्यमेव नः ॥ २११९ ॥
भेदबुद्धिस्तु यत्रांशे स्यात्केनचिदुपाधिना ।
न तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानं भेदबुद्ध्याऽवधारितम् ॥ २१२० ॥

jvālādeḥ kṣaṇikatve'pi pratyabhijñeti cenna tat |
tatra hi pratyabhijñeyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nityameva naḥ || 2119 ||
bhedabuddhistu yatrāṃśe syātkenacidupādhinā |
na tatra pratyabhijñānaṃ bhedabuddhyā'vadhāritam || 2120 ||

“If it be urged that—‘in the case of such things as the flame, it is found that though it exists for one moment only, yet there is recognition’,—the answer is that it is not so; what is recognised in these cases is the universal, and that is eternal, for us. In cases where there is notion of difference in regard to any aspect of the thing, on account of certain circumstantial conditions,—there is no recognition, as is clear from the notion of difference.”—(2119-2120).

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts anticipate and answer the objection that Recognition is not infallible (not always true):—[see verses 2119-2120 above]

Such things’—this includes the cases of Hail, nails and grass, etc.—which are cut and grow again,—as also that of water-falls; as in these cases also there is Recognition that these are the same Hairs and Nails, the same grasses, the water-fall, the same river-water and so forth.

This is not right. In all these case what is recognised is the Universal,—the commonalty—such as ‘Fire’ (in the case of the Lamp) and so forth; and this Universal is held to he eternal; where then is there any falsity in our Premiss? The individual form of these things, which is evanescent, that certainly is not recognised (as being the same); where then is there any falsity in our Premiss?

In regard to any aspect’—as in regard to the greater or less degree.

On account of certain circumstantial conditions’—the lesser degree being due to going upward.

Question:—How do you know that there is no Recognition in such cases?

Answer:—‘As is clear from the notion of difference’,—it is deduced from the presence of the notion of difference that there is in such cases.—(2119-2120)

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