The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2111-2116 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2111-2116.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ममाप्रमाणमित्येवं वेदोऽर्थं बोधयन्नपि ।
वक्तुं न द्वेषमात्रेण शक्यते सत्यतेऽसत्यवादिना ॥ २१११ ॥
द्वेषादसम्मतत्वाद्वा नच स्यादप्रमाणता ।
नच प्रीत्यभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां प्रमाणमवकल्प्यते ॥ २११२ ॥
द्विषन्तोऽपि च वेदस्य नैवाप्रामाण्यकारणम् ।
किंचिज्जल्पन्ति ये नैते भवेयुः सत्यवादिनः ॥ २११३ ॥
धारणाध्ययनव्याख्याकर्मनित्याभियोगिभिः ।
मिथ्यात्वहेतुरज्ञातो दूरस्थैर्ज्ञायते कथम् ॥ २११४ ॥
अभियुक्ता हि ये यत्र तन्निबद्धप्रयोजनाः ।
तत्रत्यगुणदोषाणां ज्ञाने तेऽधिकृता यतः ॥ २११५ ॥
ये तु ब्रह्मद्विषं पापा वेदाद्दूरं बहिष्कृताः ।
ते वेदगुणदोषोक्तीः कथं जल्पन्त्यलज्जिताः ॥ २११६ ॥

mamāpramāṇamityevaṃ vedo'rthaṃ bodhayannapi |
vaktuṃ na dveṣamātreṇa śakyate satyate'satyavādinā || 2111 ||
dveṣādasammatatvādvā naca syādapramāṇatā |
naca prītyabhyanujñābhyāṃ pramāṇamavakalpyate || 2112 ||
dviṣanto'pi ca vedasya naivāprāmāṇyakāraṇam |
kiṃcijjalpanti ye naite bhaveyuḥ satyavādinaḥ || 2113 ||
dhāraṇādhyayanavyākhyākarmanityābhiyogibhiḥ |
mithyātvaheturajñāto dūrasthairjñāyate katham || 2114 ||
abhiyuktā hi ye yatra tannibaddhaprayojanāḥ |
tatratyaguṇadoṣāṇāṃ jñāne te'dhikṛtā yataḥ || 2115 ||
ye tu brahmadviṣaṃ pāpā vedāddūraṃ bahiṣkṛtāḥ |
te vedaguṇadoṣoktīḥ kathaṃ jalpantyalajjitāḥ || 2116 ||

“While the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, the assertion that ‘it is not a means of cognition for me’ should not be made by a truthful person, by reason of sheer malice. It cannot cease to be a means of cognition, on the ground that there is malice against it or because it is not popular; nor can anything become a means of cognition, on the ground that one likes it and it is popular. Even those who are hostile to the Veda do not assert any reason why it should not be a means of right cognition;—by virtue of which they could be regarded as truthful people. When people, who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the veda and upon the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it? It is only persons who are fully conversant with a thing and who have their purpose centred therein that can detect the good and bad points of that thing. Those evil-minded people on the other hand, who are hostile to Vrahman and have been far removed from the Veda,—how can those people bare-facedly speak of the good and bad points in the Veda?”—(2111-2116).

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

This is how the Mīmāṃsaka argues—“Things do not become established or otherwise merely according to one’s whim; by virtue of which the mere assertion of the opinion would set aside the validity of Verbal Cognition; what is established by reason must be accepted by both parties; it has been explained that the conviction derived from the Vedic declarations regarding Agnihotra, etc. is exceptionally strong; how then can it be said that it is not a Means of Cognition? It is a mere assertion of yours, wholly devoid of reason”.—Such in brief is what is meant by the Mīmāṃsaka.

Because it is not popular’.—People’s agreement constitutes its popularity.

Aloof from, the Veda’—Śākya and others who keep away from the Veda; because they are excluded from its study, etc.

Who have their purpose centred therein’—i.e. whose purpose—ends of life, in the shape of sacrifice, etc.—is centred—expounded—in the Veda.

Hostile to Brahman’—i.e. Hostile to the Veda. Or ‘Brahman’ may be taken as standing for the knowledge derived from the Veda.—(2111-2116)

“Or, it may be that the Inference is not annulled by Verbal Cognition; even so, the Proposition of the Buddhist is defective; because it is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition”.

This is the idea expounded in the following:—[see verse 2117 next]

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