by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 2088-2095 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2088-2095.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
कर्त्ता तावददृष्टः स कदाऽऽप्यासीदितीष्यते ।
अदृष्टपूर्वसम्बन्धः संप्रत्यज्ञानहेतुकः ॥ २०८८ ॥
अनुमानविहीनोऽपि सोऽस्तीति परिकल्प्यते ।
आगमोऽपि न तत्सिद्ध्यै इतरोऽकृतकृतकाकृतकोऽस्ति न ॥ २०८९ ॥
स्वयमेवाप्रमाणत्वात्कृतकोऽस्य न बोधकः ।
मन्वादिवचनस्यापि तत्कृतैव हि सत्यता ॥ २०९० ॥
असम्बद्धस्तु विद्विष्टः सत्यवादी कथं भवेत् ।
अतोऽन्यकर्तृकोऽप्यस्ति वेदकारागमो न नः ॥ २०९१ ॥
वेदकारसदृक्कश्चिद्यदि दृश्येत सम्प्रति ।
ततस्तेनोपमानेन कर्तुरप्युपमा भवेत् ॥ २०९२ ॥
वेदकारादृते किंचिन्न सिद्ध्येत्प्रमितं यदि ।
अर्थापत्त्या प्रतीयेत वेदकारस्ततो ध्रुवम् ॥ २०९३ ॥
ननु तेन विना किंचिद्वेदे यन्नोपपद्यते ।
अस्मिन्सति हि बह्वेव प्रामाण्यादि न सिद्ध्यति ॥ २०९४ ॥
स पञ्चभिरगम्यत्वादभावेनैव गम्यते ।
तेन दुर्लभभावोऽसौ प्रमाणाभावबाधनात् ॥ २०९५ ॥
karttā tāvadadṛṣṭaḥ sa kadā''pyāsīditīṣyate |
adṛṣṭapūrvasambandhaḥ saṃpratyajñānahetukaḥ || 2088 ||
anumānavihīno'pi so'stīti parikalpyate |
āgamo'pi na tatsiddhyai itaro'kṛtakṛtakākṛtako'sti na || 2089 ||
svayamevāpramāṇatvātkṛtako'sya na bodhakaḥ |
manvādivacanasyāpi tatkṛtaiva hi satyatā || 2090 ||
asambaddhastu vidviṣṭaḥ satyavādī kathaṃ bhavet |
ato'nyakartṛko'pyasti vedakārāgamo na naḥ || 2091 ||
vedakārasadṛkkaścidyadi dṛśyeta samprati |
tatastenopamānena karturapyupamā bhavet || 2092 ||
vedakārādṛte kiṃcinna siddhyetpramitaṃ yadi |
arthāpattyā pratīyeta vedakārastato dhruvam || 2093 ||
nanu tena vinā kiṃcidvede yannopapadyate |
asminsati hi bahveva prāmāṇyādi na siddhyati || 2094 ||
sa pañcabhiragamyatvādabhāvenaiva gamyate |
tena durlabhabhāvo'sau pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt || 2095 ||
“(a) An author or the Veda is not perceived;—it could only be assumed that such a one existed in the past [but such an assumption can have no basis].—(b) When any relationship (of concomitance) of such an author has never been perceived before, any inference that could be made regarding him must be based only upon present ignorance; hence if such author is assumed (by the other party) it cannot be through inference.—(c) As regards verbal authority (scripture), that also cannot point to an author of the veda; because no other scripture is without an author; and hence any other scripture which is the work of an author, being itself unreliable, could not provide a reliable notion of the author of the veda. As regards the words of manu and others, their reliability rests upon the veda itself. As for any other writer who has no connection with the veda and is hostile towards it,—how can such a one be truthful on this point? Hence for us, there is no scripture compiled even by others which can declare an author of the veda.—(d) In case someone were visible now who is similar to the author of the veda, then alone, on the basis of that analogy, there might be an analogical cognition of such an author.—(e) If there were something vouched for by the means of right cognition which would be inexplicable if there were no author of the veda,—then alone, such an author of the veda might be accepted on the basis of presumption; as a matter of fact however, there is nothing in the veda which could not be possible without such an author;—on the contrary, if there were an author, there is much, in the shape of its reliability and so forth, which could not be duly cognised.—Thus then, being not amenable to the said five means of knowledge, the author in question becomes amenable only to the sixth, negation (non-apprehension): consequently, he is one whose existence is impossible,—as it is precluded by negation, which is the only means of cognition (applicable to him).”—(2088-2095)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The following might be urged against the Mīmāṃsaka—How is it known that there is no ‘doer’, ‘author’ (in the case of the Veda), who would be the substratum of Defects?
In view of this, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to establish the fact of there being no Author of the Veda, by showing that no such Author can be cognised by any of the five Means of Cognition:—[see verses 2088-2095 above]
“(a) The Author of the Veda cannot be known by means of Sense-perception; because it can never be pointed out that ‘Here is the Author of the Veda’, simply because he is not seen at the present moment. It might be assumed that ‘there was an Author’; and as no such person has ever been seen, the assumption can only be that ‘he existed at some time’; and this idea would not be reliable,—this is what is meant and has to be added.
“(b) Nor can the Author be known by means of Inference; this is what is said by the words—‘Adṛṣṭapūrva, etc. etc.’;—the detractors of the Veda premise a relationship, in the shape of cause and effect, between the Veda and the Author who has never been seen before; and such a premiss can be based only on Ignorance, as there can be no valid means of Cognition indicating any such relationship; no one can ever be able to apprehend a relationship between Smoke and the Fire that has never been seen. Hence, if such an Author is assumed, such an assumption cannot be supported by Inference.—The particle ‘api’ implies that it is without the support, not of Sense-perception only, but also of Inference.
“(c) The words ‘āgamopi, etc. etc.’ point out that the Author cannot be known by means of Verbal Authority (or Revelation, Scripture). Because, as there is no scripture other than the Veda which is itself without an author, the required scripture cannot be one which is without an author; nor can it be one that has an author; because such a scripture would itself be unreliable. Because, when the scripture would be the work of an author,—it could be the work of (1) Manu and other writers related to the Veda, or of (2) the Sādhyas and Munis not related to the Veda.—As regards the first alternative,—it is said—‘as regards the words of Manu and others, etc. etc.’:—‘Tatkṛtā’—due to the Veda;—this means that these works are not self-sufficient in their authority.—The objection to the second alternative is next stated—‘Asambaddhastu, etc. etc.’—‘who has no connection’—with the Veda; because such persons are not entitled to the study of the Veda. ‘Any other writer’—i.e. the work of a person who has no connection with the Veda.—‘Veda-kārāgamaḥ’,—i.e. speaking of the Author of the Veda.
In the word ‘prāmāṇyādi’, ‘reliability and so forth’,—‘so forth’ is meant to include Dharma and such notions.
‘Abhāvena’;—it is only by the sixth Means of Cognition, Negation, that it can be known that a certain thing does not exist; as it is that alone that envisages negation.—Or it may mean that such an Author is cognised in the form of negation—i.e. as non-existent; because there is no means of knowing him.
‘Pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt’;—‘abhāva’, cessation of the Means of Cognition; i.e. Negation as the Means of Cognition;—by this Negation, the idea of the Author is precluded. Hence it is established that there can be no Author of the Veda.—(2088-2095)