Verse 2064-2068

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथ यद्ग्राहकं रूपं तद्ग्राह्यात्तस्य भिन्नता ।
तत्संवित्तावसंवित्ते रसादिग्राहकं यथा ॥ २०६४ ॥
ग्राह्यं तद्ग्राहकाच्चैवं तत्परामृशता यतः ।
न परामृश्यतेऽवश्यं रसादिग्राहकादिवत् ॥ २०६५ ॥
द्वयं परस्परेणैव भिन्नं साध्यं रसादिवत् ।
ऐक्यरूपेण वाऽज्ञानात्सन्तानान्तरबुद्धिवत् ॥ २०६६ ॥
ज्ञानं स्वांशं न गृह्णाति ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः स्वशक्तिवत् ।
ग्राह्यत्वप्रतिषेधश्च द्वयहीना हि वासना ॥ २०६७ ॥
चैत्राज्ञानं तदुद्भूतज्ञानांशग्राह्यबोधकम् ।
ज्ञानत्वान्न भवेद्यद्वत्तस्य देहान्तरोद्भवम् ॥ २०६८ ॥

atha yadgrāhakaṃ rūpaṃ tadgrāhyāttasya bhinnatā |
tatsaṃvittāvasaṃvitte rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā || 2064 ||
grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakāccaivaṃ tatparāmṛśatā yataḥ |
na parāmṛśyate'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakādivat || 2065 ||
dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnaṃ sādhyaṃ rasādivat |
aikyarūpeṇa vā'jñānātsantānāntarabuddhivat || 2066 ||
jñānaṃ svāṃśaṃ na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat |
grāhyatvapratiṣedhaśca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā || 2067 ||
caitrājñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam |
jñānatvānna bhavedyadvattasya dehāntarodbhavam || 2068 ||

“(a) That which is the apprehender of colour must be different from what is apprehended,—because the cognition of the one does not appear on the cognition of the other as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.—(b) What is apprehended must be different from the apprehender; because one who thinks of the one does not necessarily think of the other;—as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.,—(c) For the same reason the two must, thus, be concluded to be different from one another, like taste, etc.,—(d) The two must be different, because they are never cognised as being of the same form,—like the cognition occurring in another ‘chain’.—(e) the cognition cannot apprehend any portion of itself; because it proceeds from the cognition;—like its own potency.—(f) There should be denial also of ‘apprehensibility’ (of the cognition by itself);—because the impression is devoid of the duplicate character.—(g) Caitra’s cognition cannot bring about the apprehension of the apprehensible part of the cognition arising out of his cognition;—because it is cognition;—just as the cognition appearing in another person.”—[Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 172-177]—(2064-2068)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following texts set forth a series of arguments put forward by Kumārila:—[see verses 2064-2068 above]

“(a) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is apprehended;—because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Cognition; just as the Apprehender of Taste.—Or (b) what is apprehended,—i.e. Colour, etc.,—must be different from its Apprehender; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other;—just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.—Or (c) the two—the Colour and its Apprehender—must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of,—just like Taste and Colour, etc.—Or (d) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form,—like the Cognition appearing in another ‘Chain’.—Or (e) the Cognition cannot apprehend a portion of itself,—because it is produced from the Cognition itself; like its own Potency;—this ‘Potency’ is what is known as ‘Impression’.—(f) Similarly, there should be denial of the ‘apprehensibility’ of Cognition, which is done in this form:—The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition”.

Question:—In between these two arguments where is the Corroborative Instance endowed with the character of the Probandum?

Answer “Because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character;—i.e. the character of the Apprehended and the character of the Apprehender.

(g) Or, there is another argument—This Cognition in question cannot bring about the apprehension of the portion of Cognition produced in one’s Cognition,—because it is Cognition,—just as the Cognition appearing in other persons—Maitra and the rest,—does not apprehend the portion arising out of Caitra’s Cognition.—(2064-2068)

The refutation of the above is set forth in the following:—[see verse 2069 next]