Verse 2055-2056

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यथा बाह्यजलादीनां सामर्थ्यं नियमो मतः ।
ज्ञानेष्वपि तथैवैते संविदोऽव्यतिरेकता(नः ?) ॥ २०५५ ॥
अनुमाप्रतिभासेन स्पष्टः साधारणोऽप्ययम् ।
स्पष्टं हुताशनादीनां रूपं तेन समं नहि ॥ २०५६ ॥

yathā bāhyajalādīnāṃ sāmarthyaṃ niyamo mataḥ |
jñāneṣvapi tathaivaite saṃvido'vyatirekatā(naḥ ?) || 2055 ||
anumāpratibhāsena spaṣṭaḥ sādhāraṇo'pyayam |
spaṣṭaṃ hutāśanādīnāṃ rūpaṃ tena samaṃ nahi || 2056 ||

Just as in the case of the external things, water and the rest, the presence of actual capacity is regarded as the regulating factor in ‘conformity’,—this same ‘conformity of cognition’ is found in the case of other cognitions (inferential, etc.) also, so that, in view of what appears in inference, the reason adduced by the opponent is ‘too wide’ (hence ‘inconclusive’).—Certainly the form of fire and other things (inferred) which is quite clear and distinct, is not like that of the inference itself.—(2055-2056)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Then again, though the Inferential Cognition is devoid of the objective substratum, yet it is in conformity with reality; so that the Reason adduced is clearly found where the Probandum is absent, and hence, like ‘cognisability’, it is clearly ‘too wide’, hence ‘Inconclusive’.

It might be argued that—“we do not admit that Inferential Cognition is devoid of objective substratum”.

The answer to that is—‘Certainly, the form, etc. etc.’—This argument may be thus formulated:—When a cognition is devoid of the form of something, it cannot be regarded as having that for its objective basis,—e.g. the Cognition of Colour does not have Sound for its objective;—Inferential Cognition is devoid of the external form;—hence there is apprehension of something that is contrary to a wider factor.—The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’; because the form of the Fire is quite clear and distinct; and as such, it is not like the form of the Inferential Cognition (of that Fire); because the Inferential Cognition is always somewhat hazy and indefinite.—If it were not so, then the Fire which, in Perception, is cognised in a well-defined form, as due to the burning of grasses and leaves, would appear in the same definite form in Inference also; as a matter of fact, what does appear in Inference has abandoned its well-defined form and appears only in a vague general form in accordance with the Indicative on which the Inference is based. Hence so far as the External Object is concerned, it does not appear in Inference at all. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—the General and the Particular,—which are mutually contradictory, as already explained before,—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present where the Probandum is present.—

Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—(2055-2056)