The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2051 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2051.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

धियोऽसितादिरूपत्वे सा तस्यानुभवः कथम् ।
धियः सितादिरूपत्वे बाह्योऽर्थः किंप्रमाणकः ॥ २०५१ ॥

dhiyo'sitādirūpatve sā tasyānubhavaḥ katham |
dhiyaḥ sitādirūpatve bāhyo'rthaḥ kiṃpramāṇakaḥ || 2051 ||

If the cognition is not of the ‘white’ and other forms,—then, how can it be the apprehension of the object? if it is of the form of ‘white’, etc., then what is the evidence for the external object?—(2051)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus stated the arguments negativing the External World, the Author next refutes the argument adduced by the other party in support of the External World.—[see verse 2051 above]

The external object could be proved either by Perception or by Inference; any other Means of Knowledge, if any, is included under these two.

It cannot be proved by Perception. Because, is the Perceptional Cognition, which apprehends the Object, with form? Or without form? It cannot be formless; as in that case there would be no basis for the necessary contacts (without which there can be no Perception).—Thus then, if the Cognition were not of the White and other forms,—how could it be the apprehension of the Object? It can never be so, as already explained before.—If, on the other hand, the Cognition apprehending the Object is with form, then, the only form of the Blue, etc. that would be perceived would be that in the Cognition itself, and the External Object would be only indirectly cognised (by Inference), not perceived. Because two ‘Blues’ are never perceived—one in the form of the reflection in the Cognition, and the other in the form of the external object which casts the reflection.

Thus the External Object cannot be proved by Perception.—(2051)

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