Verse 2034-2035

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

मुख्यतोऽर्थं न गृह्णाति स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थितेः ।
अर्थाकारोपरागेण वियोगाच्च न भक्तितः ॥ २०३४ ॥
शुद्धस्फटिकसंकाशमर्थाकारैरनङ्कितम् ।
यैरिष्टं वेदनं कैश्चिदिदं तान्प्रति साधनम् ॥ २०३५ ॥

mukhyato'rthaṃ na gṛhṇāti svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ |
arthākāroparāgeṇa viyogācca na bhaktitaḥ || 2034 ||
śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśamarthākārairanaṅkitam |
yairiṣṭaṃ vedanaṃ kaiścididaṃ tānprati sādhanam || 2035 ||

Primarily, the cognition does not apprehend an object at all, as it rests within its own self; also because there is absence of the imprint of the objective form; nor can it be said to do so secondarily (figuratively).—This reasoning is addressed to those who regard cognition as imprinted with the forms of things, itself being like pure rock-crystal.—(2034-2035)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of one thing by another;—what happens is only that Cognition, being of the nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the ‘apprehender’ of itself. Primarily,—in the direct primary sense,—the Cognition cannot be the apprehender of the Object; because all things rest within their own self; and the ‘self’ of one thing cannot be the ‘self’ of another.

The following might be urged:—“Primarily the Cognition of the Object is not held to be of the same kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition; the apprehensibility of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is ‘apprehensibility’ in the primary sense that is adduced; as the Reason (in the above Buddhistic arguments), then it is ‘inadmissible If on the other hand the ‘apprehensibility’ meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as ‘apprehension’ in some sort of a way,—then such a Reason cannot prove what is wanted. Because the similarity of the words ‘go’ and ‘gavaya’ cannot prove the presence of Horns in the Gavaya.—If both kinds of Reason put forward are with reference to the Blue and other forms that figure in the Cognition,—and in favour of the idea of the form belonging to the Cognition,—then, the whole argument is superfluous—proving what is already-admitted. This has been thus described—‘Under the view of the form belonging to Cognitions, what is cognised is the imprint of that form; and if what is meant to be proved is the non-difference of this with the Cognition, then the Reason would be open to the charge of proving what is already admitted’.”

It is in anticipation of—and in answer to—all this objection emanating from Bhadanta-Śubdagupta, that the Author has added the words—‘There is absence of the imprint, etc. etc.’—In the compound ‘arthākāroparāga’, ‘arthākāra’ qualifies ‘uparāya’, the meaning being—‘the imprint of (in the shape of) the form of the object’.

‘Idam’—both the aforesaid arguments in question have been put forward against the person who regards Cognition as formless. Hence they are not ‘futile’—proving what is already admitted.

Nor can there be an apprehension of something else (other than the Cognition) in the secondary (figurative) sense either; as there is no basis for such figurative expression.—(2034-2035)