Verse 2030-2031

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यत्संवेदनमेव स्याद्यस्य संवेदनं ध्रुवम् ।
तस्मादव्यतिरिक्तं तत्ततो वा न विभिद्यते ॥ २०३० ॥
यथा नीलधियः स्वात्मा द्वितीयो वा यथोडुपः ।
नीलधीवेदनं चेदं नीलाकारस्य वेदनात् ॥ २०३१ ॥

yatsaṃvedanameva syādyasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam |
tasmādavyatiriktaṃ tattato vā na vibhidyate || 2030 ||
yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dvitīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ |
nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanāt || 2031 ||

When there is cognition of a certain thing, and also that thing of which that alone is the cognition,—this thing is not-different from that cognition; or this does not differ from that. For example, the cognition of the blue, or the second moon;—and this is the cognition of blue, because it apprehends the blue form.—(2030-2031)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following texts proceed to address certain arguments to the philosopher who holds Cognition to be formless,—for the purpose of proving that there is non-difference between the Blue and other forms and the Cognition of these forms;—[see verses 2030-2031 above]

When there is Cognition of a certain thing,—and also the thing of which that alone—none other—is the Cognition,—then the latter is absolutely not-different from the former.

Or, the ‘non-difference’ may be stated conversely—the former is non-different from the latter.

What is meant is as follows:—When a certain Object has no Cognition other than a certain Cognition, that Object is non-different from that Cognition;—e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself,—or the Second Moon, which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.—The Cognition in question is the Cognition of the Cognition of the Blue; this reiterates the presence of the Probans; the ‘Subject’ or ‘Minor Term’ consists of the Blue Form and its Cognition; and the ‘non-difference’ of these two is the Probandum. The said ‘constancy of their being found together’ is the Probans. This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the text of the Great Teacher which says—‘There must be non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition, because they are always found together’.

Bhadanta-Śubhagupta however has argued as follows:—“This Probans is ‘contradictory’; because in common parlance, the term ‘together’ is never used except with another thing; hence the Reason that ‘they are cognised together’ is contradictory”.

This is not right; that Probans is ‘contradictory’ which resides only where the Probandum is known to be absent; the Probans in question does not reside only where the Probandam is known to be absent; as it resides also where the Probandum is known to be present. For instance, among people, there is the idea that the ‘two moons’ (seen by the man with defective vision) are perceived together; and yet there is no real difference between them; and people are found to use the term ‘together’ in such assertions as ‘two moons are seen together’. Similarly in the case in question, the term ‘together’ has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis of the idea that the form (Blue) appearing as ‘external’ is the ‘second’, the ‘other’,—though it is really non-different from the Cognition. In fact, all verbal usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things; whereby the mere use of the term ‘together’ would make the Inferential Indicative, which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.

The same Bhadanta-Śubhagupta says again:—“If the term ‘together’ means one, then the Reason is ‘inadmissible’; because the Blue and other things are not apprehended as one, in such shows as those of dancers, wrestlers, etc.—Nor are the Blue and the Cognition of Blue both apprehended by one (person); because even when the Blue is apprehended, the Cognitions of the same Blue, appearing in other ‘series’ or ‘chains’, are not apprehended. When again, the existence of all living beings and all ‘Cognition-moments’ are apprehended by the Omniscient Being,—how can it be admitted that there is apprehension by one only?—Then again, it is only when the apprehension of ‘others’ is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding the apprehension of one but the negation of the apprehension of others is not possible; because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and denial cannot be possible.—If the term ‘together’ is meant to convey the idea of being present at the same time, then the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddha, and also of the Mind and Mind-effects. For instance, the Cognition in other ‘chains’ which are cognised by the Blessed Lord Buddha,—that Cognition and Buddha’s Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together,—i.e. at the same time,—and yet they are different. Similarly in the case of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended ‘together’, yet they are not one and the same. Thus the Reason is ‘Inconclusive’

All this is not right. What is meant is, not ‘apprehension by one’, nor ‘apprehension of one’;—what is meant is that there is a single—not separate—apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised; that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Cognised- In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also;—nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reason be regarded as ‘inadmissible’?—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘of doubtful admissibility’; because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as has been admitted also by our opponent, the upholder of the Reality of the External World.—This also serves to refute the ‘inadmissibility’ urged on the basis of the alternatives—whether what is meant is ‘the apprehension of one’, etc. etc.—Then again, it is not a fact that the ‘Cognition-moments’ figuring in another ‘chain’ are cognised by the Buddha. Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from, all obscuring influences, is entirely free from defects as those of the ‘apprehender’ and the ‘apprehended’. This has been thus declared—‘For Him, there is no Apprehended, nor Apprehension, nor Apprehensibility by other Cognitions; it is pure Void’.—As regards the declaration of ‘being untrammelled’ (made in regard to Buddha’s Cognition),—that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things; as has been declared in the following words—‘He is held to be omniscient, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations,—as is going to be described later on’. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’.

Says the Opponent:—“Ācārya Dharmakīrti, in setting forth the Pūrvapakṣa (the Opponent’s view), says—‘At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later’; and here he has shown that what the term ‘together’ means is simultaneity, not sameness; it is only when simultaneity is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant”.

There is no force in this argument. Because difference in time is included under real material difference; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the ‘less wide’ term should not be inconcomitant with the ‘wider’ term.

Nor again can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the Cognition cognised by the Buddhas; because in that case there is no limitation of the Cognition being one; because one by one all the Buddhas cognise the Cognition. For this same reason, in their case also, there is consideration regarding the wrongness of Cognitions; because each Cognition is cognised by itself.

Or, there may be Cognition of the Cognition of others by the Buddha; even so, the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’; because there is always differentiation. Even when there is diversity in the apprehension of two things, there is always differentiation; in the case of Oognitions however, when appearing in the same ‘Chain’, there is no diversity in their specific Individualities. Hence what is meant is that there is apprehension of the Cognition only when there is apprehension of the Object. The apprehension of the Cognition of the Blessed Lord however is not always the same as the apprehension of the Cognitions occurring in other ‘Chains’,—there is another Cognition also; because the separateness (difference) of His own Cognition is also distinctly apprehended. For this same reason, the Reason does not become wrong, in view of Colour and Light; because Light is perceived also alone by itself; and Colour also is perceived by certain animals (e.g. Cats), even when there is no Light.—Thus then, the Reason, not being present where the Probandum is known to be absent, cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’.—(2030-2031)