Verse 2026-2028

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

गोचरान्तरसंचारस्तथा न स्यात्स चेक्ष्यते ।
गोचरान्तरसंचारे यदन्त्यं तत्स्वतोऽन्यनः ॥ २०२६ ॥
न सि(द्ध्येत्तस्य चा)सिद्धौ सर्वेषामप्यसिद्धता ।
अतश्चान्ध्यमशेषस्य जगतः संप्रसज्यते ॥ २०२७ ॥
अन्त्यस्य तु स्वतःसिद्धावन्येषामपि सा ध्रुवम् ।
ज्ञानत्वादन्यथा नैषां ज्ञानत्वं स्याद्धटादिवत् ॥ २०२८ ॥

gocarāntarasaṃcārastathā na syātsa cekṣyate |
gocarāntarasaṃcāre yadantyaṃ tatsvato'nyanaḥ || 2026 ||
na si(ddhyettasya cā)siddhau sarveṣāmapyasiddhatā |
ataścāndhyamaśeṣasya jagataḥ saṃprasajyate || 2027 ||
antyasya tu svataḥsiddhāvanyeṣāmapi sā dhruvam |
jñānatvādanyathā naiṣāṃ jñānatvaṃ syāddhaṭādivat || 2028 ||

[If it were as suggested], then there would be no room for the cognition of any other object. And yet such cognition is actually found to appear. And if there is cognition of another object, the last of the series of cognitions could not be cognised by any other cognition; so that that would remain uncognised; and if that is not cognised, all the rest of the series must remain uncognised; so that the entire world becomes bund (unconscious).—If then, the first cognition be regarded as self-cognised, then the same may surely be said of the others also;—because they are all cognition; otherwise, they would not be cognition at all,—like the jar and such things.—(2026-2028)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition,—then in connection with this latter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form ‘I have had the Cognition of the Cognition’; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be postulated another apprehension;—as without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions.—It cannot be the Object that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.—Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could be effective only in the case of Visual Perception.—Nor can the said string of Cognitions be regarded as without cause. As, in that case, there would he the possibility of its being there at all times.

It might be said that “it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one after the other”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2026-2028 above]

In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness). Because, each succeeding Cognition would be the Object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause; and so long as it had such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objective? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not—simply because it is external,—prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition. If, even though external, the Object could prevent the Cognition of the Cognition, then no one could never apprehend any Cognition at all. Because there is no point of time when an external Object is not present.—Remembrance also would become rooted out; because there would be no Apprehension that could bring about Remembrance.—Further, for the appearance of the conceptions of ‘Past’ and the rest, which appear when the Object concerned is not there,—there would be no cause; so that the series of conceptions would continue there as long as the world lasts; and no one would have any anxiety for anything at all.

Granting the presence of other objects,—even though it is not possible,—even so, it behoves you to explain by what the other (second) Cognition is cognised.

It might be said that—“that same succeeding Cognition, while apprehending another Object, would apprehend both, this Object as well as the preceding Cognition

But this cannot be right. Because, when after the Cognition of Sound, there follows the Cognition of Colour,—the Cognition of Sound would figure in the later Cognition of Colour, and hence there should be Cognition of Sound also which would be figuring in its own Cognition.—Even for one who regards Cognition as formless, unless there is apprehension of Sound, there can be no apprehension of what apprehends the Sound; e.g. unless there is apprehension of the stick, there can be no apprehension of the Holder of the Stick. Thus Sound also would figure in the Visual Cognition of Colour. Similarly on the said principle, in the Cognition of Cogitation also in regard to such objects as the letter ‘A’ and the like,—there would always be two verbal expressions one after the other. For instance, when after the Cogitation over the letter ‘Ī’, one Cogitates over the letter ‘A’,—then, the Cogitation of the letter ‘A’ should apprehend the apprehender of the letter ‘Ī’ also; consequently the verbal expression relating to the letter ‘Ī’ as figuring in its own Cognition, should appear in the Cognition of the letter ‘A’.

Further, under this view, everything would appear in Consciousness twice over; because it must so appear at the time of its own Cognition also. But as a matter of fact, there is no such double appearance of Objects.

For these reasons, it is not right to say that the succeeding Cognition apprehends both (the preceding Cognition and also the Object).

It might be urged—“The one final Cognition might remain unapprehended and unremembered; where would be the harm?”

The answer to this is—‘If there is Cognition of another Object, etc. etc.’—Self-Cognition being not accepted by the other party, the last Cognition cannot be regarded as ‘self-cognised’; nor can it be cognised by anything else; as in that case there would be an infinite regress. Thus the final Cognition being uncognised, the Cognition preceding it must remain uncognised, as it would apprehend something that is not perceptible; and so on and on backwards, the Object also will remain uncognised; so that no Object would ever be cognised at all; which means that the entire world becomes blind.

If, in order to avoid the said difficulty, it be admitted that the final Cognition of the series is cognised by itselfthen the entire lot of Cognitions might bo self-cognised; as all are equally ‘Cognition’,

This argument may be formulated as follows:—Every Cognition, for its own Cognition, does not depend upon the operation of anything else,—because it is Cognition,—like the final Cognition of the series,—the Cognition under dispute is a Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, like the Jar and other things; and hence it would lose the character of ‘Cognition’. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary.—(2026-2028)