The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2018-2019 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2018-2019.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थस्यानुभवो रूपं (तच्च ज्ञा)नात्मकं यदि ।
तदर्थानुभवात्मत्वं ज्ञाने युक्तं नचास्ति तत् ॥ २०१८ ॥
उपेतार्थपरित्यागप्रसङ्गात्तस्य तु स्वतः ।
जातेऽप्यनुभवात्मत्वे नार्थवित्तिः प्रसिद्ध्यति ॥ २०१९ ॥

arthasyānubhavo rūpaṃ (tacca jñā)nātmakaṃ yadi |
tadarthānubhavātmatvaṃ jñāne yuktaṃ nacāsti tat || 2018 ||
upetārthaparityāgaprasaṅgāttasya tu svataḥ |
jāte'pyanubhavātmatve nārthavittiḥ prasiddhyati || 2019 ||

‘Apprehension’ forms the very nature of the object. if that apprehension were of the nature of ‘cognition’, then it might be correct to regard the ‘cognition’ as being of the nature of the ‘apprehension of the object’.—But it cannot be so (under your view), as that would involve the abandoning of your doctrine; even so, though the cognition would come to be of the nature of ‘apprehension’, there would be no apprehending of objects.—(2018-2019)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following question might be raised—“How is it known that the ‘apprehending of the object’ is of the nature of Cognition,—on account of which ‘Cognition’ and ‘apprehending of the object’ are regarded as synonymous?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2018-2019 above]

‘Apprehension’ must be regarded as of the nature—form—of the Object; otherwise, how could the Cognition operate over it? There can be no operation of anything upon what does not exist—e.g. the ‘Hares’ Horn Consequently if the said ‘nature’ of the Object in the form of Apprehension were not-different from Cognition, then alone could it be correct to regard the Cognition as being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects,—as has been declared (by the Opponent) in the sentence—“the illuminativeness of the Cognition consists in its being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects” (Text 2014).

On being pressed hard, the Opponent might admit the non-difference of Cognition from the Apprehension of Objects; hence it is added—‘But it cannot be-so under your view’;—‘it’ stands for the idea of the Apprehension being non-different from Cognition.

Your opinion’,—viz.: that “Cognition is devoid of the apprehension of itself”;—this would be abandoned if the said non-difference were admitted. That is, if it be admitted that the Cognition is not different from the Apprehension of Objects, it would mean that Cognition is self-cognised.

The following might be urged:—“When we speak of Cognition as ‘illuminative’, we do not mean that it is so because it is of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects; but only that it is of the nature of Apprehension, pure and simple”.

The answer to this is—‘Even when, etc. etc.’—‘Tasya’ stands for the Cognition.—Even though. Cognition has now come to be of the nature of mere Apprehension, not of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects,—even so there could be no distinct Apprehension of Objects,—such as ‘this is the apprehension of Blue, not of Yellow—(2018-2019)

Question:—“Why should not there be such apprehension?”

Answer:—[see verse 2020 next]

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