The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2017 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2017.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ननु चार्थस्य संवित्तिर्ज्ञानमेवाभिधीयते ।
तस्यां तदात्मभूतायां को व्यापारोऽपरो भवेत् ॥ २०१७ ॥

nanu cārthasya saṃvittirjñānamevābhidhīyate |
tasyāṃ tadātmabhūtāyāṃ ko vyāpāro'paro bhavet || 2017 ||

It is the ‘apprehending of the object’ that is called ‘cognition’, when then, it forms its own essence, how could there be any other function over it?—(2017)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged (against Kumārila):—‘How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?’

It has been asserted (under Text 2013) that—“while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself—This is irrelevant. Because the ‘apprehending of the object’ is not something different from the Cognition. For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as ‘vitti’ (apprehension), ‘upalabdhi’ (comprehension), ‘arthapratiti’ (objective consciousness), and ‘vijñapti’ (ideation). When, then, this ‘apprehending of the object’ forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other ‘functioning’,—in the shape of the ‘apprehending of the object’—could the Cognition have, apart from itself,—by virtue of which it could be said that ‘the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object’? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.—(2017)

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