The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2009-2010 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2009-2010.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्परिच्छेदरूपत्वं विज्ञानस्योपपद्यते ।
ज्ञानरूपः परिच्छेदो यदि ग्राह्यस्य संभवेत् ॥ २००९ ॥
अन्यथा तु परिच्छेदरूपं ज्ञानमिति स्फुटम् ।
वक्तव्यं नच निर्दिष्टमित्थमर्थस्य वेदनम् ॥ २०१० ॥

tatparicchedarūpatvaṃ vijñānasyopapadyate |
jñānarūpaḥ paricchedo yadi grāhyasya saṃbhavet || 2009 ||
anyathā tu paricchedarūpaṃ jñānamiti sphuṭam |
vaktavyaṃ naca nirdiṣṭamitthamarthasya vedanam || 2010 ||

The pact of the cognition being of the nature of the apprehension of the object would be possible, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the form of cognition. Otherwise it should be clearly stated that cognition is of the nature of apprehension; it has not been pointed out that ‘the apprehension of the object is in this form’.—(2009-2010)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Bhadanta-Śubhagupta has argued as follows:—

“Even though not assuming the form of the Object, the Cognition does apprehend it, because it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object; hence no question should be raised as to how it apprehends it and like what it apprehends it. This has been thus asserted—‘If the Cognition does apprehend the Objoct, then it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object, and no question should be raised as to how, and like what, it apprehends it

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2009-2010 above]

All this would be true if it were proved that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of something other than itself; as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved.—Because the Cognition does not apprehend the Object by its mere existence; if it did so, it would apprehend all things.—Nor does it apprehend the Object, as its product; for, if it did, there would be apprehension of the Eye and other organs also.—Nor is Cognition held to be with form, by virtue of which, being similar to the Object, it could not be distinguished from it and thus regarded as ‘cognisant’ of it.—Thus then, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the nature of Cognition, then the Cognition could be said to be of the nature of the apprehension of the object. Otherwise, how can it be unequivocally stated that“Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the object”?

In fact, Cognition being something different from the apprehension of the object, it must be of the nature of Cognition itself; and hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone is what exists.

The following might be urged:—“There must be some peculiarity in the Cognition, whereby it apprehends the Object only; and what this peculiarity is cannot be exactly indicated”.

The answer to this is given in the words—‘It has not been pointed out, etc. etc.’—‘Bhavati’ has to be supplied. Though every specific entity cannot be indicated, yet by some feat of imagination it is always spoken of somehow. If it were not so, then no peculiarity could be asserted in regard to Colour and other things also. The mere vague assertion, that ‘Cognition is the apprehension of the object’ does not state anything clearly and unequivocally and with certainty.

From this it follows that if the existence of objects were established in this vague indefinite form, the objects would indeed become really well-established!—(2009-2010)

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