The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1999 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1999.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अनिर्भासं सनिर्भासमन्यनिर्भासमेव च ।
विजानाति नच ज्ञानं बाह्यमर्थं कथञ्चन ॥ १९९९ ॥

anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsamanyanirbhāsameva ca |
vijānāti naca jñānaṃ bāhyamarthaṃ kathañcana || 1999 ||

Either ‘not envisaging a form’, or ‘envisaging a form’, or ‘envisaging something else’,—the cognition cannot apprehend any external thing—(1999)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no ‘object’, the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the ‘apprehended’ and the ‘apprehender’:—[see verse 1999 above]

Neither as ‘formless’, nor as ‘with form’, nor ‘with the form of something other than the object’,—can there be any apprehension of the external Object; and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another ‘Chain’ which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.

Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the ‘yellow’ form apprehends also the ‘white’ conch-shell. This has been thus asserted by Kumārila [Ślokavārtika-nirālambanavāda, 108]—“In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time,—be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time.”

It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative.—(1999)

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