The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1967-1969 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1967-1969.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भासमानः किमात्माऽयं बाह्योऽर्थः प्रतिभासते ।
परमाणुस्वभावः किं किं वाऽवयविलक्षणः ॥ १९६७ ॥
न तावत्परमाणूनामाकारः प्रतिवेद्यते ।
निरंशानेकमूर्त्ताभ(नां?) प्रत्ययाप्रतिवेदनात् ॥ १९६८ ॥
व्यपेतभागभेदा हि भासेरन्परमाणवः ।
नान्यथाऽध्यक्षता तेषामात्माकारासमर्पणात् ॥ १९६९ ॥

bhāsamānaḥ kimātmā'yaṃ bāhyo'rthaḥ pratibhāsate |
paramāṇusvabhāvaḥ kiṃ kiṃ vā'vayavilakṣaṇaḥ || 1967 ||
na tāvatparamāṇūnāmākāraḥ prativedyate |
niraṃśānekamūrttābha(nāṃ?) pratyayāprativedanāt || 1968 ||
vyapetabhāgabhedā hi bhāseranparamāṇavaḥ |
nānyathā'dhyakṣatā teṣāmātmākārāsamarpaṇāt || 1969 ||

When the external object is perceived,—in what form is it perceived? is it in the form of the atom? Or in that of a composite thing?—As for the former, the form of the atom is not what is actually cognised; because in the cognition, there is no recognition of several impartite corporeal things; while, if the atoms had appeared in the cognition, they should have appeared as devoid of all distinctions of component parts; otherwise they would not be ‘perceptible’, for the simple reason they would not be impressing the cognition with their own form.—(1967-1969)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as one and not-different from the Atoms,—or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms;—or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.—These are the likely alternatives.

It cannot be the first of these; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as one and not-different from the Atoms; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms; in fact, what is actually recognised in Consciousness is the idea of something gross,—If the reading is ‘pratyaye aprativedanāt’, there is to be no compounding. The argument may be formulated as follows That which does not appear in its own form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, should not be regarded as ‘perceived’,—for instance, the ‘sky-lotus’;—the Atom, many and corporeal, does not appear in this form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, which always apprehends the gross form;—thus there is no apprehension of the wider- character (which would imply perceptibility); because ‘Perceptibility’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearance of its own form—This same invariable concomitance is shown by the words—‘If the Atoms, etc., etc.’—(1967-1969)

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