The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1965-1966 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1965-1966.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यदि ज्ञानातिरेकेण नास्ति भूतचतुष्टयम् ।
तत्किमेतन्नु विच्छिन्नं विस्पष्टमवभासते ॥ १९६५ ॥
तस्यैवं प्रतिभासेऽपि नास्तितोपगमे सति ।
चित्तस्यापि किमस्तित्वे प्रमाणं भवतां भवेत् ॥ १९६६ ॥

yadi jñānātirekeṇa nāsti bhūtacatuṣṭayam |
tatkimetannu vicchinnaṃ vispaṣṭamavabhāsate || 1965 ||
tasyaivaṃ pratibhāse'pi nāstitopagame sati |
cittasyāpi kimastitve pramāṇaṃ bhavatāṃ bhavet || 1966 ||

“If the four material substances do not exist apart from the cognition (consciousness, idea), then, how is it that they are distinctly and clearly perceived?—Even when so perceived, if they are held to be non-existent, then for you, what would be the proof for the existence of the cognition also?”—(1965-1966)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Pratītya -samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādissannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’. In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows:—This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’; and this Ideation or Idea, through the diversity of ‘chains’ varying with each individual ‘Being’, is endless, and impure—for persons who have not realised the Truth,—hut pure,—for those whose ‘Karma’ has been wiped off; it is in perpetual, flux (being destroyed every moment), and affects all living beings; it is not one and unmodifiable, as held by the ‘followers of the Upaniṣads’ (Vedāntins).

Such is the view of the Idealist Buddhists.

The idea of the entire universe being mere Idea is got at by the following two methods:—(1) Anything external, in the form of Earth, etc., which could be apprehended, being non-existent, there can be no apprehender;—or (2) even though existent, in another ‘Chain’, the two factors would be devoid of the character of the ‘apprehender’ and ‘apprehended’.—The argument, may be formulated as follows;—Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition of the Reflected Image;—and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum); because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.; because such a world would be devoid of one as well as of several forms. This argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is not of one or several forms cannot be regarded by an intelligent man as ‘existent’,—e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’;—and the Earth, etc. postulated by other people are devoid of one and several forms; hence there is non-apprehension in them of the wider character—as, no third alternative possible, existence is invariably concomitant with the presence of one or several forms;—and the impossibility of the relation of ‘pervaded and pervader’ (that which is concomitant, and that with which it is concomitant) would be the reason that would reject any idea to the contrary; hence the Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive—Nor can it be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present everywhere where the Probandum is known to be present.

In bringing forward against this Reason, the charge of being ‘inadmissible’, the Opponent has argued thus—‘You may accept the principle that the material substances do not exist at all’; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptible facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is not concomitant (with the Probandum),—in the following—[see verses 1965-1966 above]

Distinctly’,—This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;—and ‘clearly’ indicates that it is clearly perceived.

This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum—‘Even when so, etc. etc.’.—(1965-1966)

The Answer to the above is as follows:—[see verses 1967-1969 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: