Verse 1962-1963

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

इहत्याभ्यासपूर्वत्वे साध्ये दृष्टेष्टबाधनम् ।
भवान्तरीयहेतुत्वे साध्यशून्यं निदर्शनम् ॥ १९६२ ॥
अविशेषेण साध्ये तु हेतोरस्य विरुद्धता ।
तथैवान्यभवाभ्यासहेतुत्वविनिवर्त्तनात् ॥ १९६३ ॥

ihatyābhyāsapūrvatve sādhye dṛṣṭeṣṭabādhanam |
bhavāntarīyahetutve sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam || 1962 ||
aviśeṣeṇa sādhye tu hetorasya viruddhatā |
tathaivānyabhavābhyāsahetutvavinivarttanāt || 1963 ||

“(a) if what is meant to be proved is the fact of the feelings being produced by repeated experience during the present life,—then such an idea is annulled by well-perceived facts, and is also contrary to what is desired (by the buddhist),—(b) if what is meant to be proved is the fact of their being produced by the repeated experience of other lives,—then the corroborative instance is devoid of the pro-bandum.—(c) If what is meant to be proved is the mere unqualified fact of the feelings being produced by ‘repeated experience’,—the reason put forward is ‘contradictory’,—because it proves the contrary of the fact of the feelings' being due to the repeated experience of another life.”—(1962-1963)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following texts set forth the objections of the other party:—[see verses 1962-1963 above]

The sense of the objection is as follows:—

“In reference to the feelings of Love, etc. appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved—(1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during present life?—Or (2) that they proceed from the repeated experience during other lives?—Or (3) that they proceed only from mere ‘repeated experience’ without any qualifications?—As, if this is proved, then by implication, it becomes proved that they are due to experiences of the ‘other world’;—these are the only alternative views possible.

“(1) If it is the first,—then there is ‘bādhana’ of it—incompatibility with facts of perception; because in fact, the Love, etc. in question are never found to appeal from experience dining the present life-and there is ‘bādhana’—denial—also of what is desired by the upholder of the ‘other world’.

“(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes devoid of the Proband urn; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.

“(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes ‘contradictory’;—as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives.”—(1962-1963)

The above objection is answered in the following—[see verse 1964 next]