The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1948-1953 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1948-1953.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

रागद्वेषादयश्चामी पटवोऽभ्यासयोगतः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां भवन्तः परिनिश्चिताः ॥ १९४८ ॥
इहत्याभ्यासरहितास्ते ये प्रथमभाविनः ।
को हेतुर्जन्मनस्तेषां यदि न स्याद्भवान्तरम् ॥ १९४९ ॥
न ह्यालम्बनसान्निध्यात्तेषां जन्मोपपद्यते ।
प्रतिसङ्ख्यानसद्भावे तद्भावेऽप्यतदुद्भवात् ॥ १९५० ॥
प्रतिसङ्ख्यानिवृत्तौ च तेषां प्राबल्यदर्शनात् ।
नष्टाजातेपि विषये विपर्यासाभिवृद्धितः(नः ?) ॥ १९५१ ॥
शुभात्मीयस्थिरादींश्च समारोप्याङ्गनादिषु ।
रागादयः प्रवर्त्तन्ते तद्रूपा विषया नच ॥ १९५२ ॥
तदनालम्बना एव सदृशाभ्यासशक्तितः ।
इहत्या अपि वर्त्तन्ते रागादित्वाद्यथोत्तरे ॥ १९५३ ॥

rāgadveṣādayaścāmī paṭavo'bhyāsayogataḥ |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bhavantaḥ pariniścitāḥ || 1948 ||
ihatyābhyāsarahitāste ye prathamabhāvinaḥ |
ko heturjanmanasteṣāṃ yadi na syādbhavāntaram || 1949 ||
na hyālambanasānnidhyātteṣāṃ janmopapadyate |
pratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve tadbhāve'pyatadudbhavāt || 1950 ||
pratisaṅkhyānivṛttau ca teṣāṃ prābalyadarśanāt |
naṣṭājātepi viṣaye viparyāsābhivṛddhitaḥ(naḥ ?) || 1951 ||
śubhātmīyasthirādīṃśca samāropyāṅganādiṣu |
rāgādayaḥ pravarttante tadrūpā viṣayā naca || 1952 ||
tadanālambanā eva sadṛśābhyāsaśaktitaḥ |
ihatyā api varttante rāgāditvādyathottare || 1953 ||

As a matter of fact, all these feelings of love, hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition,—as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.—These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life; what then is the cause of their appearance,—if there is no other life?—Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is disgust; and when this disgust ceases, they are found to be strong, even in connection with past and future things, when the counterfeelings appear in intensified form.—The feelings of love, hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to women and other things, when the man attributes to them goodness, devotedness and constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not be actually there.—For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing, without the excitants being actually present,—through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past,—because they are feelings of love, etc.,—like these same feelings appearing subsequently.—(1948-1953)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following texts set forth another argument in proof of the idea of the ‘other world’:—[see verses 1948-1953 above]

The argument may be thus formulated:—The strength of the feelings of Love, Hatred, Jealousy, Haughtiness and Pride, etc.,—as also Wisdom, Compassion, Sympathy and so forth—is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of the varying degrees' of these feelings;—during the present life, there is in the Body, etc. of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life;—so this is a Reason based upon the relation of cause and effect. As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the Reason cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’.—This is what is meant by the words—‘Ascertained by positive, etc. etc.’.

It cannot be urged that—“the Reason is ‘contradictory’, as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives

What is meant is that these feelings as appearing for the first time during the present life have not been habitually repeated during this life;—this may not be a Reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives; but what is stated as the Reason being admitted to be a fact, it could not be without some cause; if it were without cause, it would be there at all times;—hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of Love, Hatred, etc.? Hence the conclusion is that the habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings;—and thus the ‘other world’ becomes established.

The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question; because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of Love, etc. do not appear at all,—if there happen to be present a feeling of Disgust against the evil character of the things.—The term ‘pratisaṅkhyāna’, ‘disgust’ stands for that counter-feeling against Love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil.—Sometimes, even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of Love, etc. actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.

Then again, even in regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of Disgust has ceased, and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire. And when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing, or the presence or absence of another thing,—the one cannot be the cause of the other; otherwise these would be incongruities.

For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be due to the presence of the excitants:—Because, if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things);—the feelings however do not proceed in this way; on the contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at ail; and yet the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form of goodness, etc. and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form; otherwise it would lead to absurdity.

Tat’—i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of Love, etc. as pertaining to imposed things must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant); and from this it follows that the said feelings of Love, etc., when they appear for the first time during present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.—(1948-1953)

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