The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1916 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1916.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्षीणास्रवस्य विज्ञानमसन्धानं कुतो मतम् ।
परकीयकृतान्ताच्चेन्न प्रामाण्यापरिग्रहात् ॥ १९१६ ॥

kṣīṇāsravasya vijñānamasandhānaṃ kuto matam |
parakīyakṛtāntāccenna prāmāṇyāparigrahāt || 1916 ||

Why has it been held that the consciousness of the person free from the impurities of the affections is non-contiguous? —If this view is held in accordance with the doctrine of others,—that cannot be right; because the authority (and validity) of these doctrines is not accepted (by the materialist).—(1916)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The third argument adduced by the other party is that—“the dying Consciousness of the man beset with affections can bring about another Consciousness,—because it is Dying Consciousness,—like the Consciousness of the man free from affections”.—This is now taken up:—[see verse 1916 above]

Noncontiguous’,—i.e. that which has no contiguity with another Consciousness.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the Corroborative Instance cited is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties concerned. For instance, how does the Materialist know that in; the case of the. Arhats, the dying Consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another Consciousness?

It may be that under the Buddhist Philosophy, the following assertion is found—‘My life is at an end, I have led the life of the Student, I have done my duty, I know of no more birth’,—and it is in accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that ‘there is no contiguity of the dying Consciousness’.

This however cannot be right. As a matter of fact, the Materialist does not admit the authority or validity of the doctrines of other people; how then could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way he may come to the decision that the ‘other world’ exists.

If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction,—then, why has not that same source been cited as the proof? Where was the use of putting up a Reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly that other proof could not be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist)—for which reason it has not been adduced.—(1916)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: