The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1913-1915 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1913-1915.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदाश्रयेण संभूतेस्तेन वाऽव्यभिचारतः ।
तत्र वृत्तिर्यदीष्येत तथाऽपि व्यभिचारिता ॥ १९१३ ॥
प्रागवस्थमपि ज्ञानं प्रतिक्षणविनश्वरे ।
देहवृत्तं करोत्येव प्रतिसन्धिं निरन्तरम् ॥ १९१४ ॥
एकसन्तानभावेन न चेत्तत्र विभिन्नता ।
अन्यन्नाऽप्येकसन्तानभावान्माभूद्विभिन्नता ॥ १९१५ ॥

tadāśrayeṇa saṃbhūtestena vā'vyabhicārataḥ |
tatra vṛttiryadīṣyeta tathā'pi vyabhicāritā || 1913 ||
prāgavasthamapi jñānaṃ pratikṣaṇavinaśvare |
dehavṛttaṃ karotyeva pratisandhiṃ nirantaram || 1914 ||
ekasantānabhāvena na cettatra vibhinnatā |
anyannā'pyekasantānabhāvānmābhūdvibhinnatā || 1915 ||

If the said ‘subsistence’ be held to be due either to the cognition being produced in the body as its substratum,—or to its inseparability from the body,—the reason put forward is wrong (inconclusive, doubtful). The body undergoing destruction every moment, the previous consciousness brings about an unbroken continuity of consciousness in such succeeding bodies. If, by reason of their occurring in the same chain, the two bodies be held to be not different from another,—then in the other case also, there could be no difference, on the same ground of occurrence in the same chain.—(1913-1915)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Thus then it has been proved that the ‘Subsistence’ of Cognitions in the Body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of ‘identity’ (or ‘Sameness’). If ‘the subsistence’ of the Cognition in the Body be held to consist in its being produced from it,—then the question is—is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that the Mental Cognition has the Body for its Receptacle (or Substratum),—in the way that Visual Perception is produced by the Eye which serves as its receptacle?—or, is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that it is inseparable from it;—as the Smoke is inseparable from Fire?—Both these forms of ‘Subsistence’ are inadmissible. Because Mental Cognition does not rest in the Body, like Sense-Cognition; as it does not always follow the changes in the Body. Nor is it invariably concomitant with—inseparable from—it; because in the case of ‘formless negations’, it is held that there are cognitions without the Body.

Though the facts are so, yet, for the sake of argument, the Author admits that the Reason is ‘admissible’, but proceeds to show that even so, it is ‘Inconclusive ‘(Doubtful):—[see verses 1913-1915 above]

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other Consciousnesses and the presence of the Consciousness in the Body; for instance, the Consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the Consciousness in the living body coming into existence at the next moment,—even though this latter Consciousness appears in a body other than that of the former; because the Body has only a momentary existence; hence the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive If, on the ground of their occurring in the same Chain, the two Bodies be regarded as one and the same, and on that ground the fact of the Consciousness appearing in the ‘same’ body be assumed,—then, the same might be said in the other case also—of the Bodies appearing during the stage intervening between the two physical bodies. Because the Body appearing in the other regions (at which the inter veiling bodies appear) is only one other state of the Chain of the same Body consisting of the five ‘Receptacles’ (Āyatanas),—just like the states of Childhood and old age.

In the second argument (of the Opponent) also, the Probans or Reason adduced is ‘because it is Cognition (or Consciousness)’; and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said Reason is not present where the contrary of the Probandum is known to be present; so that the Reason is clearly ‘Inconclusive’, Doubtful. This fact was quite clear; hence the Author did not mention it.—(1913-1915)

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