Verse 1911-1912

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अद्वयज्ञानपक्षे तु नायं हेतुः प्रसिद्ध्यति ।
स्वस्य स्वस्यावभासस्य वेदनात्तिमिरादिवत् ॥ १९११ ॥
उदयानन्तरध्वंसि नैरन्तर्येण लक्ष्यते ।
चेतोदेहस्य ताद्रूप्ये क्षणिकत्वं न किं मतम् ॥ १९१२ ॥

advayajñānapakṣe tu nāyaṃ hetuḥ prasiddhyati |
svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedanāttimirādivat || 1911 ||
udayānantaradhvaṃsi nairantaryeṇa lakṣyate |
cetodehasya tādrūpye kṣaṇikatvaṃ na kiṃ matam || 1912 ||

This reason is not admissible against the doctrine that ‘cognition (consciousness) alone exists’; as (under that view) what is cognised (by the cognition) is the appearance of itself; as in the case of the man with defective vision.—Further, cognition is always found to be destroyed immediately after appearance; if then, the body with the cognition is of the same nature as the cognition,—why is it not regarded as momentary?—(1911-1912)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent—“If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine of Pure Idealism—(that there is Cognition or Consciousness alone)—also being rejected on these same grounds”.

The Answer to that is as follows:—[see verses 1911-1912 above]

‘This Reason is not admissible’;—i.e. the Reason, if so applied, becomes subject to the objection of being ‘inadmissible’. For instance, the fact of ‘being cognised by both’ cannot be admitted by the Idealist; as for him what is cognised by the Cognition is always its own appearance; as in the case of the man of defective vision seeing two moons.

Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the Cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance; hence, if the Body were held to be of the same nature as the Cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the Cognition).—(1911-1912)