Verse 1893-1896

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सन्तानान्तरविज्ञानं तस्य कारणमिष्यते ।
यदि तत्किमुपादानं सहकार्यथवाऽस्य किम् ॥ १८९३ ॥
उपादानमभीष्टं चेत्तनयज्ञानसन्ततौ ।
पित्रोः श्रुतादिसंस्कारविशेषानुगमो भवेत् ॥ १८९४ ॥
उपादानतदादेयधर्मोऽयं यद्व्यवस्थितः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चितश्च स्वसन्ततौ ॥ १८९५ ॥
स्वोपादानबलोद्भूते सहकारित्वकल्पने ।
सन्तानान्तरचित्तस्य न काचिद्व्याहतिर्भवेत् ॥ १८९६ ॥

santānāntaravijñānaṃ tasya kāraṇamiṣyate |
yadi tatkimupādānaṃ sahakāryathavā'sya kim || 1893 ||
upādānamabhīṣṭaṃ cettanayajñānasantatau |
pitroḥ śrutādisaṃskāraviśeṣānugamo bhavet || 1894 ||
upādānatadādeyadharmo'yaṃ yadvyavasthitaḥ |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitaśca svasantatau || 1895 ||
svopādānabalodbhūte sahakāritvakalpane |
santānāntaracittasya na kācidvyāhatirbhavet || 1896 ||

If the cognition in some other ‘chain’ be held to be the cause (of the first cognition),—then (the question is)—is that the ‘material cause’ of it, or the ‘contributory cause’?—If it is meant to be the material cause, then the learning and culture of the parents should continue in the child’s ‘chain of cognitions’;—that such is the nature of the material cause and its effect has been ascertained, through positive and negative concomitance, in connection with one’s own ‘chain—if, on the other hand, the cognition of the other ‘chain’ be assumed to be the ‘contributory cause’, of the first cognition, on the basis of its own material cause,—then there would be nothing wrong in it.—(1893-1896)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has thus been proved that the first Cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance. The author now proceeds to demolish the view that it is produced only by another Cognition (occurring in a different Chain;—the fifth alternative put forward under Text 1880):—[see verses 1893-1896 above]

Would this ‘Cognition’ occurring in ‘another Chain’,—i.e. the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ of the Parents,—be the Material Cause or the Contributory Cause (of the First Cognition under consideration)?—It cannot be the Material Cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the Parents to continue in the Son; just as the Parents’ Cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions. It has been found in the case of all Material Causes and their Products that the embellishments of the preceding ‘moment’ continue in the succeeding ‘Moments’; this having been found, by positive and negative concomitance, to be the case is one’s own ‘Chain’,

The following might be the opinion suggested—“When one lamp is lighted from another Lamp the second lamp is not produced as equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one,—it is produced merely as a lamp without any embellishments; it acquires its own embellishments from other sources in the shape of its own wick and oū, etc.;—and the same may be the case with the Cognition in question also”.

That cannot be so; because the embellishment of the Lamp sets up a ‘chain’ in its own substratum also; because it is itself evanescent; that is the reason why on the exhaustion of the ‘fuel’ (in the shape of the oil and wick), the Lamp ceases to exist. The embellishment of Learning and Culture however is not evanescent; as it continues for a long time. Hence it is not possible for mere Cognition without embellishments to be produced in the manner of the Lamp.

Further, in the case of the Lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and less number of atoms; of the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities. In the case in question however, the single entity, the Cognition in the mother, would have the peculiarities of the cultural and other embellishments, while when appearing in the son, it would be without these peculiarities;—who can impart such a teaching?

Then again, the reductio ad absurdum that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Material Cause of the other; but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp; because it belongs to an entirely different ‘Chain’. Hence what has been urged is nothing at all.

Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother—e.g. the sweat-born insects,—how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series?—We resist from further argumentation on this subject.

If, on the other hand, it be held that the Cognition of the other Chain is a contributory Cause of the First Cognition,—then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.—(1893-1896)