Verse 1878-1885

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकत्वेनावक्लृप्तत्वान्निःस्वभावतया मता ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वाद्यनिर्देश्या वियत्कमलपङिक्तवत् ॥ १८७८ ॥
सा चानादिरनन्ता च न सिद्धिं कथमृच्छति ।
यद्यहेतुकमेतत्स्याच्चित्तमाद्यतया मतम् ॥ १८७९ ॥
नित्यहेतुसमुद्भूतं नित्यं सत्स्वत एव वा ।
भूतमात्रोद्भवं वाऽपि यद्वाऽन्यज्ञानमात्रजम् ॥ १८८० ॥
गर्भादावादिविज्ञानं तच्चाहेतुतत्राहेतु न युज्यते ।
कादाचित्कतया सत्त्वं सर्वथाऽस्यान्यथा भवेत् ॥ १८८१ ॥
नापि नित्यमनःकालदिगीशात्मादिभिः कृतम् ।
तत एव सदा सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्तदभावतः ॥ १८८२ ॥
एकं नित्यस्वभावं च विज्ञानमिति साहसम् ।
रूपशब्दादिचित्तानां व्यक्तं भेदोपलक्षणात् ॥ १८८३ ॥
क्षोणीतेजोजलादिभ्यो भूतेभ्यो भूतिरस्य न ।
व्यक्तिर्वा सर्वचित्तानां यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गतः ॥ १८८४ ॥
स्थिररूपं परैरिष्टं तद्धि भूतचतुष्टयम् ।
सहकारिव्यपेक्षाऽपि स्थिरे पूर्वमपाकृता ॥ १८८५ ॥

ekatvenāvaklṛptatvānniḥsvabhāvatayā matā |
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśyā viyatkamalapaṅiktavat || 1878 ||
sā cānādiranantā ca na siddhiṃ kathamṛcchati |
yadyahetukametatsyāccittamādyatayā matam || 1879 ||
nityahetusamudbhūtaṃ nityaṃ satsvata eva vā |
bhūtamātrodbhavaṃ vā'pi yadvā'nyajñānamātrajam || 1880 ||
garbhādāvādivijñānaṃ taccāhetutatrāhetu na yujyate |
kādācitkatayā sattvaṃ sarvathā'syānyathā bhavet || 1881 ||
nāpi nityamanaḥkāladigīśātmādibhiḥ kṛtam |
tata eva sadā sattvaprasaṅgāttadabhāvataḥ || 1882 ||
ekaṃ nityasvabhāvaṃ ca vijñānamiti sāhasam |
rūpaśabdādicittānāṃ vyaktaṃ bhedopalakṣaṇāt || 1883 ||
kṣoṇītejojalādibhyo bhūtebhyo bhūtirasya na |
vyaktirvā sarvacittānāṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ || 1884 ||
sthirarūpaṃ parairiṣṭaṃ taddhi bhūtacatuṣṭayam |
sahakārivyapekṣā'pi sthire pūrvamapākṛtā || 1885 ||

It is because it is conceived as ‘one’ (composite), and is featureless and incapable of being indicated either as the same, or as different (from the component members of the chain),—that the chain has been regarded as a ‘non-entity’:—just like the ‘line of sky-lotuses’.—As it is, why cannot the chain be accepted as being without beginning and without end?—If [it had a beginning and] the first member of the ‘chain’ consisted of the first cognition,—this could be held to be either (1) ‘without cause’,—or (2) as produced by an eternal cause,—or (3) as eternal by itself,—or (4) as produced from any substance,—or (5) as produced by any other cognition.—(1) The first cognition would appear at the very inception of the foetus, and it could not come about without cause; because otherwise, its existence, which is only occasional, would be quite the reverse (everlasting).—(2) Nor could it be brought about by such eternal causes as mind, time, space, god, soul and so forth; because on that very account it should be eternal.—(3) On account of the absence of the said ‘eternal existence’ it would be sheer audacity to assert that the cognition is one and eternal; as difference is clearly perceived among the cognitions of colour, sound and other things,—(4-5) nor could it be produced from, or manifested by, the material substances—earth, fire, water and air; as, in that case, all cognitions would be simultaneous; as the other party regard these substances as of permanent form; and the idea of a permanent thing requiring the help of auxiliaries has been already rejected.—(1878-1885)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

That ‘Chain’ which has been postulated as one has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the same as, or different from, the members of the Chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a ‘non-entity’;—just like the ‘Series of sky-lotuses’; and we do not base our notion of the ‘other world’ upon the states of any such one ‘Chain—If it is this ‘Chain of Cognitions, etc.’, called the ‘other world’,. which you are denying,—then, it cannot be right to deny this ‘other world’ on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said ‘Chain’; because what is actually perceived cannot be denied. All the denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of beginninglessness and endlessness,—But why cannot these—endlessness and beginninglessness,—be accepted?

If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the first cognition (the beginning),—then this initial cognition would be either (1) without cause,—or (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal Cognition or God and so forth,—or (3) it would itself be eternal,—or (4) it would be produced from any Substance,—or (5) produced by a Cognition appearing in another ‘chain’.—These are the five alternatives possible.

If each cognition in the chain were the effect of another previous cognition in the same Chain,—then alone could the Chain be beginningless, not otherwise. That is why the Author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the Chain being not beginningless,—and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives).

(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted; as under that view the Cognition would have permanent existence. Things are occasional only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything,—why then should it cease to exist?

(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable; as for that same reason it would be eternal. Effects become non-existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about,

(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted.—“Why?”—Because of the absence—of permanent existence.—The same absence is further emphasised by the words—‘It would be sheer audacity, etc. etc.’,—This points out the fact of the Opponent’s Proposition being contrary to perceived facts.

(4) The sentence ‘Nor could, etc, etc.’ rejects the fourth alternative.—‘Kṣoṇī’ is Earth,—This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one—that it proceeds from the Eternal God, etc.; because the four Major Elemental Substances are held by the other party to be eternal.—It will not be right to urge that—“the production of the Cognition from an

Eternal Cause would be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes”;—because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it.—(1878-1885)

[The refutation of the fifth alternatives follows under Text 1893.]