Verse 1869-1871

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदनन्तरसम्भूतदेहान्तरसमाश्रयः ।
यदि देहोऽपरो दृष्टः कथमस्तीति गम्यते ॥ १८६९ ॥
भिन्नदेहप्रवृत्तं च गजवाज्यादिचित्तवत् ।
एकसन्ततिसम्बद्धं तद्विज्ञानं कथं भवेत् ॥ १८७० ॥
एको ज्ञानाश्रयस्तस्मादनादिनिधनो नरः ।
संसारी कश्चिदेष्टव्यो यद्वा नास्तिकता परा ॥ १८७१ ॥

tadanantarasambhūtadehāntarasamāśrayaḥ |
yadi deho'paro dṛṣṭaḥ kathamastīti gamyate || 1869 ||
bhinnadehapravṛttaṃ ca gajavājyādicittavat |
ekasantatisambaddhaṃ tadvijñānaṃ kathaṃ bhavet || 1870 ||
eko jñānāśrayastasmādanādinidhano naraḥ |
saṃsārī kaścideṣṭavyo yadvā nāstikatā parā || 1871 ||

“When the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the body that is born subsequently? How too could the consciousness, residing in different bodies, be related to the same ‘chain of cognitions’,—being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse and other animals?—For these reasons, as the substratum of consciousness, you have either to seek for a beginningless and endless transmigrating personality,—or accept pure materialism.”—(1869-1871)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“It might be argued that—the Consciousness would be subsisting in that intermediate body which would be produced immediately after death—But that cannot be right; because no such intermediate body has ever been seen appearing immediately after death; and there can be no certainty regarding the existence of what has never been seen; as such a thing is always regarded as non-existent.

Nor can it be right for the Consciousness of one ‘chain’ to subsist in another body;—as in that case the character of being related to the same ‘chain’ would be lost;—just as in the case of the Consciousness of the different animals, Elephant, Horse and so forth.

“The argument may be formulated thus:—Consciousness appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same ‘chain’,—like the Cognition of the Elephant and that of the Horse,—the Consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting in the succeeding Intermediate Body subsist in different bodies; hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of what is contrary to the wider conception;—but as a matter of fact, there is no such apprehension;—hence the contrary must be true. That is, what are related to the same ‘Chain’ cannot subsist in different bodies,—e.g. the Consciousness of the Elephant does not subsist in the body of the Horse;—the Consciousness of every person is related to the same ‘Chain’;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; because ‘being related to the same Chain’ is invariably concomitant with ‘subsisting in the same body’, which is contrary to ‘subsisting in different bodies’.

The words—‘For these reasons, etc. etc.’—recapitulates the Materialist’s view.

‘Ādi’—is birth, beginning;—‘nidhana’ is destruction, end;—that which has neither beginning nor end is ‘beginningless and endless’.

Or, accept pure Materialism^[1];—this indicates the Lokāyata-Sūtra—‘There is no one related to the other world; hence there can be no other world’.—(1869-1871)

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

[This use of ‘nāstikatā’ is to be noted; as it affords another indication of the truth that ‘nāstika’ is not the same as ‘Atheist’; ‘nāstikatā’, as we find here, is the view that denies the other World. This is in agreement with the View of Vātsyāyana, who also sums up the ‘Nāstika’ view in the words ‘Nāsti ātmā nāsti paralokaḥ’, ‘There is no Soul, there is no other world.’]