The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1861-1862 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1861-1862.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कार्यकारणता नास्ति विवादपदचेतसोः ।
विभिन्नदेहवृत्तित्वाद्गवाश्वज्ञानयोरिव ॥ १८६१ ॥
न विवक्षितविज्ञानजन्या वा मतयो मताः ।
ज्ञानत्वादन्यसन्तानसम्बद्धा इव बुद्धयः ॥ १८६२ ॥

kāryakāraṇatā nāsti vivādapadacetasoḥ |
vibhinnadehavṛttitvādgavāśvajñānayoriva || 1861 ||
na vivakṣitavijñānajanyā vā matayo matāḥ |
jñānatvādanyasantānasambaddhā iva buddhayaḥ || 1862 ||

“There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute,—because they subsist in different bodies,—just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse.—Cognitions (consciousness) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question,—because they are consciousness,—like consciousness connected with another ‘series’.”—(1861-1862)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“Further, if the Mind that existed in the past body were the cause of the Mind (Consciousness) in the body now born,—and the Mind in the dying body were the cause of the Mind in the future body,—then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation in the continuity of the Mind, the existence of the ‘other world’ might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between the said two Minds in dispute,—because they reside in different bodies,—just like the Cognition of the Cow and the Cognition of the Horse.

“Or, the produced Cognitions maybe made the ‘Subject’,—in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body;—the ‘Probans’ being the same as before, ‘because they are cognitions’;—the ‘Cognitions appearing in other Series’ supply the Corroborative Instance.

“The argument may be formulated as follows:—The (present) Cognition cannot be produced by the last Cognition in the Past body,—because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition appearing in another Series;—the Cognitions appearing in the Body in question are all Cognitions;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; inasmuch as ‘being cognition’ is concomitant with the contrary of ‘being produced by the Cognition in the last Body in question”.—(1861-1862)

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