Verse 1835-1840

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थक्रियासमर्थाः स्युरतीतानागता इमे ।
न वा सामर्थ्यसद्भावे वर्त्तमानास्तदन्यवत् ॥ १८३५ ॥
अवर्त्तमानतायां तु सर्वशक्तिवियोगिनः ।
नष्टाजाताः प्रसज्यन्ते व्योमतामरसादिवत् ॥ १८३६ ॥
तुल्यपर्यनुयोगाश्च सर्वे व्योमादयोऽकृताः ।
अनैकान्तिकताक्लृप्तेर्न तेपि विनिबन्धनम् ॥ १८३७ ॥
नियमार्थक्रियाशक्तिर्भावानां प्रत्ययोद्भवा ।
अहेतुत्वे समं सर्वमुपयुज्येत सर्वतः ॥ १८३८ ॥
नियतार्थक्रियाशक्तिजन्म प्रत्ययनिर्मितम् ।
वर्त्तमानस्य भावस्य लक्षणं नान्यदस्ति च ॥ १८३९ ॥
अतीतानागतानां च तदखण्डं समस्ति वः ।
तत्किं न वर्त्तमानत्वममीषामनुषज्यते ॥ १८४० ॥

arthakriyāsamarthāḥ syuratītānāgatā ime |
na vā sāmarthyasadbhāve varttamānāstadanyavat || 1835 ||
avarttamānatāyāṃ tu sarvaśaktiviyoginaḥ |
naṣṭājātāḥ prasajyante vyomatāmarasādivat || 1836 ||
tulyaparyanuyogāśca sarve vyomādayo'kṛtāḥ |
anaikāntikatāklṛpterna tepi vinibandhanam || 1837 ||
niyamārthakriyāśaktirbhāvānāṃ pratyayodbhavā |
ahetutve samaṃ sarvamupayujyeta sarvataḥ || 1838 ||
niyatārthakriyāśaktijanma pratyayanirmitam |
varttamānasya bhāvasya lakṣaṇaṃ nānyadasti ca || 1839 ||
atītānāgatānāṃ ca tadakhaṇḍaṃ samasti vaḥ |
tatkiṃ na varttamānatvamamīṣāmanuṣajyate || 1840 ||

Are these ‘past’ and ‘future’ things capable of effective action? Or not?—If they have that capacity, then they must be regarded as ‘present’, like other ‘present’ things.—If the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ are not regarded as ‘present’, then they must be devoid of all capacities,—just like the ‘sky-lotus’,—the ākāśa and other ‘non-produced’ (eternal) things are open to the same objection; hence these cannot serve to make our reason ‘inconclusive’,—in the case of all entities, their restricted capacity for effective action must be due to some cause; if it were without a cause, everything would be used for everything. In fact, the restricted capacity for effective action must be brought about by a cause; and there is no other characteristic feature of the ‘present’ thing. In the case of the ‘past’ and ‘future’ also, the said capacity is there fully complete, according to your view; wherefore then should not the character of the ‘present’ be attributed to them?—(1835-1840)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, there are the two alternatives—these Past and Future things are capable of effective action—or not capable.—If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as ‘Present’,—like those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated—Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present,—as those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed,—and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the Reductio ad absurdum.—The Probans cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the absence of the ‘Present’ character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities,—just as in the ‘sky-lotus’,—The argument may be thus formulated:—Things that are not-‘Present’ are also not-efficient for any action,—e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’,—and the Past and Future things are not ‘Present’; hence there is perceived in them the absence of the wider character.

Nor can this argument be said to be ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the three ‘eternal verities’—Ākāśa, Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha,—which do not undergo modifications;—because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).

Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as ‘Inconclusive’ (or Doubtful).

Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause; otherwise, if it were without cause, them there could be nothing to restrict it; and the capacity of things would, in that case, not be restricted (or limited); with the result that each and every thing would be utilised in bringing about each and every effect. Thus it cannot be right to restrict the efficiency of the eternal verities, Ākāśa and the rest. Consequently they do not supply the ground for regarding the Reason as ‘Inconclusive’.

Nor can it be urged that the former Reason is one whose presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion; because the efficiency that pertains to a particular efficient activity,—the birth of which is due to causal factors,—is what characterises the ‘Present’; and this characteristic of the ‘Present’ is present intact in the Past and Future things also; hence, there being no other basis for this, why should these be not regarded as ‘Present’?—(1835-1840)