The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1833 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1833.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथाप्यक्षणिकास्ते स्युः कृतान्तस्ते विरुध्यते ।
क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्काराः सिद्धान्ते हि प्रकाशिताः ॥ १८३३ ॥
युक्तिबाधाऽपि सन्तश्चेन्नियमात्क्षणभङ्गिनः ।
वर्त्तमाना इव प्राक्तु प्रतिबन्धोऽत्र साधितः ॥ १८३४ ॥

athāpyakṣaṇikāste syuḥ kṛtāntaste virudhyate |
kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ siddhānte hi prakāśitāḥ || 1833 ||
yuktibādhā'pi santaścenniyamātkṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ |
varttamānā iva prāktu pratibandho'tra sādhitaḥ || 1834 ||

If, ox the other hand, the said things are not momentary,—then that goes against your doctrine; under your doctrine it has been shown that all modifications are momentary.—(1833)

The view in question is opposed to reason also: if the things are existent, they must be momentary, like present things. the invariable concomitance between these two terms has been already established before.—(1834)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1833]:

If the other alternative is accepted—that the Past and the rest are not momentary—then it goes against your doctrine.—The term ‘Kṛtānta’ stands for Siddhānta, accepted doctrine.—The doctrine referred to is that ‘all modifications are momentary’,—(1833)

[verse 1834]:

Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to Reason also. For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary,—like the Present thing,—the Past and the Future are existent—hence they must be momentary. Previously—under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Concomitance of this Probans (Being existent, with the Probandum, Being momentary) has been established. Hence it cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful). Further, ‘existence’ is characterised by capacity for effective action:—what is not-momentary is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous;—and when there is no effective action, there must be cessation of existence also, which is characterised by effective action. Thus Existence becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.—(1834)

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