The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1822-1828 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1822-1828.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अतीतश्च पदार्थोऽयमभूत्वा भवनात्स्फुटम् ।
वर्त्तमानोऽन्यवत्प्राप्तः कादाचित्कतयापि च ॥ १८२२ ॥
सदा सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वाऽहेतुत्वेऽन्यानपेक्षणात् ।
हेतोर्नियतसत्त्वश्च वर्त्तमानोऽर्थ उच्यते ॥ १८२३ ॥
प्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधादिवैलक्षण्यं परैर्मतम् ।
संस्कृतत्वं च रूपादेर्जातिस्थित्यादियोगतः ॥ १८२४ ॥
तत्र जातिर्विशेषं कं जनयन्त्यभिधीयते ।
जनिकाऽस्येति तद्रूपादजातादपरं परम् ॥ १८२५ ॥
अशक्योत्पादनस्तावदनन्योऽतिशयस्ततः ।
सत्त्वात्प्रागपि निष्पत्तेर्निष्पत्त्युत्तरकालवत् ॥ १८२६ ॥
अन्यस्त्वतिशयो नास्ति व्यतिरेकादसङ्गतेः ।
असत्कार्यप्रसङ्गश्च तस्य पूर्वमसत्त्वतः ॥ १८२७ ॥
अन्यथात्वे स्थितौ नाशे चान्यानन्यविकल्पयोः ।
जरादिविषया दोषा एत एवानुषङ्गिणः ॥ १८२८ ॥

atītaśca padārtho'yamabhūtvā bhavanātsphuṭam |
varttamāno'nyavatprāptaḥ kādācitkatayāpi ca || 1822 ||
sadā sattvamasattvaṃ vā'hetutve'nyānapekṣaṇāt |
hetorniyatasattvaśca varttamāno'rtha ucyate || 1823 ||
pratisaṅkhyānirodhādivailakṣaṇyaṃ parairmatam |
saṃskṛtatvaṃ ca rūpāderjātisthityādiyogataḥ || 1824 ||
tatra jātirviśeṣaṃ kaṃ janayantyabhidhīyate |
janikā'syeti tadrūpādajātādaparaṃ param || 1825 ||
aśakyotpādanastāvadananyo'tiśayastataḥ |
sattvātprāgapi niṣpatterniṣpattyuttarakālavat || 1826 ||
anyastvatiśayo nāsti vyatirekādasaṅgateḥ |
asatkāryaprasaṅgaśca tasya pūrvamasattvataḥ || 1827 ||
anyathātve sthitau nāśe cānyānanyavikalpayoḥ |
jarādiviṣayā doṣā eta evānuṣaṅgiṇaḥ || 1828 ||

Such a past entity would be one that has come into existence, not having been there before, and as such it would clearly be ‘present’,—just like any other ‘present’ entity; also because it would be occasional.—If an entity has no cause, it can be either eternally existent or non-existent, because it would not be dependent upon anything else. That however, which has its existence dependent upon a cause must be called ‘present’.—Then again, other people have postulated that ‘modification’ of form, etc. is different in character from ‘pratīsaṅkhyānirodha’ (dissociation from impurities brought about by transcendental knowledge), and other ‘eternal verities’; and this ‘modification’ or embellishment of form and other things, comes about through birth, existence, etc.; now what is that peculiarity by producing which, birth is said to be ‘productive’ of the thing? Is it something non-different from the ‘unborn’ form? Or different from it? If the peculiarity is non-different from the form, then there can be no ‘production’ of it; as it would, in that case, be there even before the ‘birth just as after it. As for a different peculiarity, there can be no such,—because by reason of this difference, there can be no relation between them. Further, as it would not be existent before, it would involve the notion that the effect was not existent (which is incompatible with the opponent’s doctrines).—Similarly if there were ‘reversal of character’, ‘continuance’ and ‘destruction’ (brought about respectively by the embellishments of ‘decay’, ‘stability’ and ‘non-eternality’),—the objections based upon their being ‘different or non-different’, ‘decay’ and the rest, would be applicable to these also.—(1822-1828)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged:—“In the case of such ‘Past’ entities as the ‘Partial (or divided) cause’, capacity for action is actually held to be there; hence the conclusion that ‘no effect can be produced’ cannot be admitted”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1822-1828 above]

Just like any other present Entity’—i.e. any other Entity whose ‘present’ character is not disputed.

Also because it would be occasional’;—this also goes with ‘it would be Present’.

The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as Irrelevant. Because as a matter of fact that thing is called ‘Present’ which has been produced by the Causal Link (or Factor); and what is occasional must owe its birth to a Causal Factor; because for that which has no cause, there are only two conditions possible—perpetual existence or non-existence; for the simple reason that its existence is not dependent upon anything else; hence what is occasional must have an existence that is brought about by a Causal Factor,—and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be ‘Present’; that is to say, ‘Being Present’ is invariably concomitant with ‘being occasional’.

Further, if the Entity is really objectively ‘Past’ and ‘Future’, then all ‘Embellishments’ (or Modifications) would be everlasting; and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the ‘Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge’ and other ‘eternal verities’.

It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as ‘modified’—not Ākāśa and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said ‘Eternal Verities

This is the view that has been held by other people.

This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of modification—(1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternality. Among these, Birth produces things, Existence leads to their continuance, Decay leads to their decadence, and Non-eternality destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.

Now the question arises—What is that Peculiarity which Birth produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as ‘productive’ of the Form, etc.?—Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives.

It cannot be non-different from Form, etc.; because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of ‘Birth’, and as such it would be incapable of being brought about,—just as after its accomplishment; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.

Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc.; because as it would be different from them, there could be nothing to determine that ‘this Peculiarity belongs to that Form For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity,—as they are held to be different; if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in. Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible;—those of container and contained being included under that of being produced. If then the relation of being produced from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, etc.—then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone; and under the circumstances, what would ‘Birth’ do to it?—It might be argued that “the Form produces the Peculiarity, through Birth”,—The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the Birth which can render no help at all. Otherwise it would lead to an absurdity. If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth,—just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.

From all this it follows that if there is difference, then there can be no relationship.

Further, if it be held that the said ‘Peculiarity’ did not exist before,—then it would mean the acceptance of the view that the effect has been nonexistent (which is inconsistent with the opponent’s doctrines).

Similarly, if Decay brings about a reversal of character,—and if Existence brings about stability,—and if Non-eternality brings about destruction,—then the question regarding these—‘Reversal’, etc.—being different or non-different, will arise, as it arose in connection with Birth; and all the objections then urged would be applicable in the case of these also.—(1822-1828)

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