The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1794-1796 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1794-1796.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तैः कारित्रमिदं धर्मादन्यत्तद्रूपमेव वा ।
अभ्युपेयं यदन्याऽस्ति गतिः काचिन्न वास्तवी ॥ १७९४ ॥
अन्यत्वे वर्त्तमानानां प्रागूर्ध्वं वाऽस्वभावता ।
हेतुत्वसंस्कृतत्वादेः कारित्रस्येव गम्यताम् ॥ १७९५ ॥
अन्यथा नित्यतापत्तिः स्वभावावस्थितेः सदा ।
नैतद्रूपातिरिक्तं हि विद्यते नित्यलक्षणम् ॥ १७९६ ॥

taiḥ kāritramidaṃ dharmādanyattadrūpameva vā |
abhyupeyaṃ yadanyā'sti gatiḥ kācinna vāstavī || 1794 ||
anyatve varttamānānāṃ prāgūrdhvaṃ vā'svabhāvatā |
hetutvasaṃskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasyeva gamyatām || 1795 ||
anyathā nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā |
naitadrūpātiriktaṃ hi vidyate nityalakṣaṇam || 1796 ||

These people will have to admit that this ‘activity’ is either different from, or the same as, the object concerned; as there can be no other way in which it can really exist.—If it is something different from the object, then the past and future states of ‘present’ things would have to be regarded as formless,—because they are ‘causes’ and are ‘embellished’, and so forth,—like the activity. otherwise, the things would be everlasting; as the ‘form’ would be there all the time; and apart from this, there is no other characteristic of the ‘everlasting—(1794-1796)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The said Activity will have to be regarded by these people either as different from, or the same as, the Entity; as there can be nothing apart from both ‘difference’ and ‘non-difference’, as these are mutually exclusive; the affirmation of one being invariably concomitant with the denial of the other; and there is no other way in which the thing can exist.

If then the Activity is something different from the Entity, then the Past and Future states of Present things would have to be regarded as ‘formless’,—because of their being causes and being embellished,—like the Activity.—The term ‘and so forth’ is meant to include ‘being an entity’ and so forth.—Otherwise—that is, if, they were not formless in the Past and in the Future,—then, all ‘embellished’ things would have to be regarded as eternal; as the ‘form’ (or Nature) would be always there; and the ‘eternality’ of a thing is nothing more than being always there; as declared in the following words—‘The learned men regard that Form as eternal which is never destroyed’.—(1794-1796)

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