by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1764-1775 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1764-1775.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
व्यावृत्तिश्चक्षुरादीनां न सिद्धा जनकादियम् ।
अविशेषेण यत्तेषामाधा(त्मा?)पि जनको मतः ॥ १७६४ ॥
स्वभावान्नच भावानां व्यावृत्तिरुपपद्यते ।
स्वभावाद्धि परावृत्तौ नैःस्वाभाव्यं प्रसज्यते ॥ १७६५ ॥
अन्यस्माज्जनकात्तेषां व्यावृत्तिरुपवर्ण्यते ।
अतज्जनकरूपत्वं वाच्यं तच्चेष्टमेव नः ॥ १७६६ ॥
न ह्यप्युत्पादकं तस्य स्वरूपेणैव वर्ण्यते ।
नियतास्तत्र ते सर्वे स्वहेतुभ्यः समुत्थिताः ॥ १७६७ ॥
एकात्मानुगतत्वात्तु यद्येकजनका इमे ।
आत्मैकत्रापि सोस्तीति किमन्यैः सहकारिभिः ॥ १७६८ ॥
विशेषान्तरवैकल्यादेके न जनकं यदि ।
ननु भेदादशक्तास्तेऽभेदे वा विकलाः कथम् ॥ १७६९ ॥
यथा त्वयं विशेषेपि न सर्वं सर्वकारणम् ।
नानात्वस्याविशेषेपि तथैव नियमो भवेत् ॥ १७७० ॥
भेदेऽपि जनकः कश्चित्स्वभावनियमाद्भवेत् ।
अन्वये त्वेक एकस्य जनकोऽजनकश्च किम् ॥ १७७१ ॥
भेदोऽप्यत्रास्ति चेदस्तु स किं तस्यैव वस्तुनः ।
नहि तस्यान्वयादन्यो ननु भेदो न कारकः ॥ १७७२ ॥
स एव भाविकश्चार्थो यो नामार्थक्रियाक्षमः ।
स च नान्वेति योऽन्वेति कार्यं तस्मान्न जायते ॥ १७७३ ॥
यं चात्मानमभिप्रेत्य पुमानेष प्रवर्तते ।
विद्येते तद्गतावेव भेदाभेदावकल्पितौ ॥ १७७४ ॥
अन्यथा ह्यात्मना भेदो व्यावृत्त्या च समानता ।
अस्त्येव वस्तु नान्वेति प्रवृत्त्यादिप्रसङ्गतः ॥ १७७५ ॥
vyāvṛttiścakṣurādīnāṃ na siddhā janakādiyam |
aviśeṣeṇa yatteṣāmādhā(tmā?)pi janako mataḥ || 1764 ||
svabhāvānnaca bhāvānāṃ vyāvṛttirupapadyate |
svabhāvāddhi parāvṛttau naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ prasajyate || 1765 ||
anyasmājjanakātteṣāṃ vyāvṛttirupavarṇyate |
atajjanakarūpatvaṃ vācyaṃ tacceṣṭameva naḥ || 1766 ||
na hyapyutpādakaṃ tasya svarūpeṇaiva varṇyate |
niyatāstatra te sarve svahetubhyaḥ samutthitāḥ || 1767 ||
ekātmānugatatvāttu yadyekajanakā ime |
ātmaikatrāpi sostīti kimanyaiḥ sahakāribhiḥ || 1768 ||
viśeṣāntaravaikalyādeke na janakaṃ yadi |
nanu bhedādaśaktāste'bhede vā vikalāḥ katham || 1769 ||
yathā tvayaṃ viśeṣepi na sarvaṃ sarvakāraṇam |
nānātvasyāviśeṣepi tathaiva niyamo bhavet || 1770 ||
bhede'pi janakaḥ kaścitsvabhāvaniyamādbhavet |
anvaye tveka ekasya janako'janakaśca kim || 1771 ||
bhedo'pyatrāsti cedastu sa kiṃ tasyaiva vastunaḥ |
nahi tasyānvayādanyo nanu bhedo na kārakaḥ || 1772 ||
sa eva bhāvikaścārtho yo nāmārthakriyākṣamaḥ |
sa ca nānveti yo'nveti kāryaṃ tasmānna jāyate || 1773 ||
yaṃ cātmānamabhipretya pumāneṣa pravartate |
vidyete tadgatāveva bhedābhedāvakalpitau || 1774 ||
anyathā hyātmanā bhedo vyāvṛttyā ca samānatā |
astyeva vastu nānveti pravṛttyādiprasaṅgataḥ || 1775 ||
The ‘exclusion’ (differentiation) of the eye, etc. from the cause (of the cognition of blue) is not admitted, without qualification. Because the nature of the eye, etc. is also regarded as the cause; and it is not possible for anything to be ‘excluded’ from its own nature; if there were ‘exclusion’ of a thing from its own nature, the thing would become devoid of all character. When ‘exclusion’ is spoken of, it is exclusion from another cause that is meant; what is meant being that the eye is not of the form of that other cause and this is quite acceptable to us,—it is not that what is productive of the cognition is described precisely as it exists. In fact, all cognitions proceed from their own specific causes. If, on the ground of their being of the same nature, they were regarded as a single productive cause,—then, as the said nature itself is there (as the cause’, what would be the use of other auxiliaries if it be held that—‘on account of defects in other particulars, the one (nature) is not productive (of the cognition)’,—then (the answer is that) those causes are incapable (of bringing about the cognition in question), by reason of difference. If there were no difference, how could they be defective?—Just as, even when there is difference—as among particular things,—everything is not the cause of every other thing,—in the same way, even though there would be no difference in ‘plurality’, yet there would be restriction (of only some causes bringing about some effects). Even when there is difference, it is only a certain thing that would be productive of the particular effect by reason of its nature. In the case of ‘inclusiveness’, how could the one thing be productive and non-productive of the same one thing?—If there is difference in this case also,—the difference may be there; but is that difference from that thing only? There can be no difference apart from the ‘inclusive’ (productive cause); and this is non-productive. In fact, that alone is a real entity which is capable of effective action; and this entity is non-inclusive; and from what is inclusive, the effect is not produced. In fact difference and nondifference can be not-imagin ary (real) only in relation to that form or nature in reference to which the man has recourse to activity. Otherwise the difference is there by its very ‘nature’, and the ‘general’ character also is there being due to ‘exclusion the thing itself is not ‘inclusive’ (comprehensive); as in that case there would be most incongruous activities.—(1764-1775)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
If mere ‘differentiation from the character of the productive’ is put forward without any qualification, as the Probans, then it cannot be ‘admitted Because as a matter of fact it is not admitted that there is unqualified ‘differentiation’ of the Eye, etc. from the character of being productive; for the nature of the Eye, etc. also is regarded as productive; why should then there be any such restriction as that the effect must always be produced by this Cause, not by another? This Cause may produce it, and the other may also produce it; we see no incongruity in this. Under the circumstances, if the ‘differentiation of the Eye, etc.’ meant were without reservation of any kind, then there would be their differentiation from their own nature, which would mean that they are ‘devoid of nature or character’ (featureless). It is for this reason that there can be no differentiation of things from their own nature.
If then, ‘the differentiation of the Eye, etc.’ meant to be the Probans be that from other productive causes (of Cognition)—than their own nature,—then the Probans is ‘inconclusive’; as in that case what is differentiated from the other nature may not be of that nature, but it need not cease to be productive (of the cognition); because everything is productive, in its own form, not in the form of something else; and from that nature of itself in which it is held to be productive, it has not been differentiated;—why then should it cease to be productive? So that the Probans put up is found to be ‘Inconclusive’.
If then, what is meant by ‘not having the nature or character of a certain thing’ is exclusion by way of ‘contradistinction’,—then the argument is superfluous; because ‘differentiation of character’ among things mutually is what is admitted by both parties.
The compound ‘atajjanakarūpatvam’ is to be thus explained;—‘That other cause’ is the Colour,—there is the nature or form of this,—which is ‘atajjanakarūpa’,—and that which does not possess this form or character of the other Cause (Colour, etc.);—that is, it has not the same character or form as Colour, etc.—Or, it may be taken as a Karmadhāraya first and then compounded with the negative term as Bahuvrīhi.—Or again, it may be taken as a three-membered Bahuvrīhi.—[The sense remains the same under all these explanations].
There arises the following question:—“In the bringing about of a certain effect,—why should the independent (unmixed) productive character be attributed to the Eye, etc. themselves, by virtue of which these alone could be restricted to that effect?”
The answer to this is that ‘In fact, all cognitions proceed, etc. etc.’— This serves also to answer the objection urged to the effect that—“the difference of the Ear from the cognition being the same as that of the Eye, why should not the Ear be regarded as productive of it?”.—Thus then the ‘nature’ of things being restricted, even when there is difference, it is only one thing that is productive, not the other. There is nothing incongruous in this.
If then the Eye, etc, were regarded as productive, on the) ground of their having a common character, though different,—then that one nature of them would be productive and hence the only Cause; which would mean that the effect proceeds from that alone; and in that case, the other eoniributary causes would have to be regarded as useless.
If it be urged that “the one Cause cannot produce the effect, on account of defects in other particulars”,—then those particulars that are regarded as ‘defective’ would be incapable, impotent,—why?—by reason of difference; i.e.—because they are different from that comprehensive ‘nature’ which has been regarded as capable (of producing the effect in question); and if what is incapable happen to be defective, then that cannot hamper the production of the effect-; as in that case anything might cease to be produced at all.
It might be urged that—“we do not regard the General and Particular aspects of things to be absolutely distinct, and hence the Reason put forward ‘by reason of difference’ becomes inadmissible”.
The answer to this is as follows:—If there were no difference, how could they be defective? That is, if the Particulars are non-different from the General, then it should not be said that ‘The one thing is not productive by reason of the defective character of particulars’. Hence, when the General is there in its perfect form, those Particulars that are non-different from that General cannot be defective. When between two things, one does not always share the fate of the other, they cannot be of the same ‘nature’.
Further, the incongruity urged is there in your case also: ‘Presence’ or ‘Inclusion’ being the same in all things, why does not everything produce everything? Just as, in your case, though the Presence or Inclusion is there in all cases, everything does not produce everything, so it would be in our case also. So there is no force in this.
Then again, even when the difference is equally present in several things, it is only one thing, not others, that produces a certain effect; and this might be due to the restriction on the productiveness of things,—on the principle that the ‘nature’ of one thing is not the ‘nature’ of the other; and there can be no incongruity in this.
When however, the productiveness belongs to one comprehensive entity,—then one and the same entity would be productive as well as non-productive,—how could these two mutually contradictory affirmation and denial subsist in the same entity?There could be no incongruity if they subsisted in different entities. This is what is meant by the words of the text—‘Ekasya, etc.’, ‘How could the one thing be both productive and non-productive, etc. etc.’.
The following might be urged—“We do not regard anything to be absolutely comprehensive (inclusive), on account of which there would be the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive of an effect;—what we hold is that there is difference also; so that non-productiveness would not be incongruous”,
There may be difference; but it has to be explained whether this difference from the ‘productive’ nature is meant to belong to the same comprehensive ‘productive nature’, or to another. It cannot belong to that same; because there can be no exclusion (difference) of a thing from its own nature; as in that case it would become nature-less (devoid of its character). Nor can it belong to another; if it is different, then, as it would be of the productive nature, and not imperfect, it could not be regarded as nonproductive; if it were, that would lead to an absurdity.
We grant that that same thing may be different from its own nature; even so, the incongruity of one and the same thing being both productive and non-productive remains unanswered. For instance, even when the difference is there, it could not be effective in bringing about the one effect in question.
‘There can be no difference apart from its inclusion (or comprehensiveness); in fact, it would be that same inclusion; so that the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive would still be there.—The term ‘anvaya’ (Inclusion) here stands for that which is comprehensive or inclusive,—i.e. the productive nature.—The particle ‘nanu’ is meant only to emphasise what is said.
Then again, it is found from positive and negative concomitance that the Effect is produced from Particulars only,—hence these Particulars themselves should be regarded as associated with Specific Individualities, which latter therefore do not necessarily indicate the ‘Universal’ or General aspect of things; because the character of the ‘Entity’ consists in capacity for effective action, Under the circumstances, whether the General is different from the Specific Individuality—or non-different from it—does not concern the man who seeks only for effective action and who is not concerned with the said difference or non-difference; as a matter of fact, when the Man seeks for effective action, he has recourse to that which he considers fit for that action; and he ponders over the difference or non-difference of only that thing; and he does not ponder over them simply because he likes to do it.
‘Otherwise’;—i.e. if Difference (Exclusiveness) and Non-difference (Inconclusiveness) are not regarded as real,—then, of the thing capable of effective action, there would be real difference or exclusiveness, in its own form,—and the General or inclusive character would be there, through the ‘exclusion’ (of all other things), which would be determined by the Conceptual Content. So that there would be no dispute on this point.
It is only to this extent that the man seeking for activity has recourse to the consideration of Difference in general; and where would there be any need for his considering any such General entity as is not capable of effective action?
It might be argued that—“The thing itself may be the General,—(the comprehensive factor),—why assume exclusion at all?”
The answer to that is—‘The Thing itself, etc. etc.’—That is, if the form of the Cloth were present in the Jar, then the man seeking to carry Honey or Water might take up the Cloth; and there would be other such incongruous activities. The other likely incongruities meant are all things being produced and destroyed at the same time and so forth.—(1764-1775)