Verse 1759

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकप्रत्यवमर्शस्य हेतवः केचिदेव हि ।
समर्थरूपनियमाद्भेदेऽप्यक्षामृतादिवत् ॥ १७५९ ॥

ekapratyavamarśasya hetavaḥ kecideva hi |
samartharūpaniyamādbhede'pyakṣāmṛtādivat || 1759 ||

It is only certain things that can serve as the basis of one and the same conception,—the restriction being due to the capacity of the form of things, even when there is difference,—as is found in the case of the sense-organs and the amṛtā and the like.—(1759)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“Why do not all things become the basis of the same conception,—the difference being equally present in all?”

Answer:—[see verse 1759 above]

No question can be raised regarding the nature of things—such as—why should Fire, and not Water, bum or be hot? All that can be reasonably asked is—to what is this nature due? Tor, if the nature of things were not due to any cause, there could be no restriction, which would lead to incongruities. Hence it should be said that it is due to its own cause; but then the question would be—to what is that due? And so on and on it would go on to a beginningless series (of causes).

‘Akṣa’ is sense-organ.—‘Amṛtā’ is the herb Guḍūcī,—‘and the like’ goes with each of the two.

What is meant is that it is only the Guḍūcī and other herbs that have the capacity to allay fever and other diseases,—not other things. And it is the Sense-Organ, the object, the Light and Attention that have the capacity to produce particular cognitions.

In the same way, it is only certain things to which belongs the capacity to bring about a single conception.

Or, the term ‘akṣa’ may stand for the Vibhūtaka fruit; and the term ‘and the like’ goes with the whole compound.—(1759)