The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1755-1757 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1755-1757.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ननु येनात्मना वस्तु समानापरवस्तुनः ।
व्यावृत्तं तत्सजातीयैस्तेनैव सदृशं यदि ॥ १७५५ ॥
विज्ञायेत विजातीयैरपि तुल्यतया तदा ।
तस्यात्मनोऽविशिष्टत्वान्न च तज्ज्ञायते तथा ॥ १७५६ ॥
सजातीयासमानोऽपि तस्माद्येन भवत्ययम् ।
आत्मना तत्समानश्च तयोर्भेदः स्वभावयोः ॥ १७५७ ॥

nanu yenātmanā vastu samānāparavastunaḥ |
vyāvṛttaṃ tatsajātīyaistenaiva sadṛśaṃ yadi || 1755 ||
vijñāyeta vijātīyairapi tulyatayā tadā |
tasyātmano'viśiṣṭatvānna ca tajjñāyate tathā || 1756 ||
sajātīyāsamāno'pi tasmādyena bhavatyayam |
ātmanā tatsamānaśca tayorbhedaḥ svabhāvayoḥ || 1757 ||

“If the form in which a certain thing is differentiated from other things,—homogeneous and heterogeneous—were the same in which it is similar to the homogeneous things, then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also; as the form would be the same in both cases.—And yet it is not so recognised.—Hence it follows that the form in which the thing is not similar to the homogeneous things, and the form in which it is similar to these,—must be different from one another.”—(1755-1757)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the objections urged by Sumati (against the Buddhist point of view):—[see verses 1755-1757 above]

Sumati argues as follows:—

“That form in which a certain thing is differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—if, in that same form, it were similar to the homogeneous things,—then it should he recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also; as the form would be the same in both cases.—And yet as a matter of fact, it is not so recognised.—Hence it follows that that form in which it is dissimilar to the homogeneous things,—and that form in which it is similar to these things,—between these two forms, there must be difference.—It might be asked—‘when it is homogeneous to them, how can it be dissimilar? And if it is dissimilar to them, how can it be homogeneous to them? The two are contradictory’.—This however does not affect our position. Because the other party regards everything as having two aspects, the General and the Particular; hence in the ‘General’ aspect, all things are said to be ‘homogeneous’ to that thing, while in its ‘Particular’ aspect, it is held to be ‘heterogeneous’; and in this latter sense, it is said to be dissimilar; so that the objection urged does not affect the position.

The compounds ‘Samānāparavastu’ stands for the ‘Samāna’, the Homogeneous, and the ‘apara’, Contrary,—i.e. the Heterogeneous.—The rest is easily intelligible, hence it is not explained in detail,—(1755-1757)

This is answered in the following—[see verse 1758 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: