The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1722-1723 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1722-1723.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परस्परस्वभावत्वे स्यात्सामान्यविशेषयोः ।
साङ्कर्यं तत्त्वतो नेदं द्वैरूप्यमुपपद्यते ॥ १७२२ ॥
परस्परास्वभावत्वेऽप्यनयोरनुषज्यते ।
नानात्वमेवम्भावेऽपि द्वैरूप्यं नोपपद्यते ॥ १७२३ ॥

parasparasvabhāvatve syātsāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ |
sāṅkaryaṃ tattvato nedaṃ dvairūpyamupapadyate || 1722 ||
parasparāsvabhāvatve'pyanayoranuṣajyate |
nānātvamevambhāve'pi dvairūpyaṃ nopapadyate || 1723 ||

If the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’ were of the nature of each other, commingling and confusion would be inevitable; hence it cannot be possible that every entity has two aspects.—If they are not of the nature of each other, then they are diverse (two distinct things), and hence it does not follow that there are ‘two aspects’ (of a single entity).—(1722-1723)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

There are two alternatives possible: (1) The ‘General’ is the same as the ‘Particular’ and (2) The ‘General’ is something different from the ‘Particular’.

In the former case, the Particular and the General being of the nature of one another, there would be commingling and confusion; the result of which would be that it could not be discerned that ‘this is General and that is Particular’; which means that there cannot be two aspects of the same entity.

If, in order to avoid the confusion, the latter alternative is accepted, even so, the two being regarded as not of the nature of each other,—there would be ‘diversity’—difference of nature between the General, and the Particular; thus there would be no confusion between the two, only if the two were entirely different; but even so,—even when the two are different,—there are two things, and not two aspects of one thing.

The following might be urged—Even when there has come about a difference in the nature of the General and the Particular, the entity that exists in the form of the General and the Particular is one and the same”.

This however will be a contradiction in terms. For instance, if the General and the Particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of those two themselves? Being non-different from one and the same thing, they must be non-different from one another,—like the nature of any single entity. When however the difference between the nature of the General and that of the Particular is accepted, there could not be any single thing that would be non-different from those two; because being non-different from the two, what is meant to be one would have to be regarded as two,—like the form of the General and the form of the Particular.

From all this it follows that the assertion that “every entity has two aspects” involves self-contradiction.—(1722-1723)

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