The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1710 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1710.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भावो भावान्तरातुल्यः खपुष्पान्न विशिष्यते ।
अतुल्यत्वविहीनश्चेत्तेभ्यो भिन्नो न सिद्ध्यति ॥ १७१० ॥

bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ khapuṣpānna viśiṣyate |
atulyatvavihīnaścettebhyo bhinno na siddhyati || 1710 ||

“If an entity were not-equal to (entirely different from) other entities, then it would not differ from the ‘sky-flower’. On the other hand, if it were entirely devoid of non-equality (difference), then it could not be regarded as anything different from those things—(1710)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

For proving the General and Particular character of things, Āhrīka has formulated the following arguments in due order:—[see verse 1710 above]

“If a certain thing spoken of—the Jar, for instance,—were not-equal to (i.e. different from) all other things,—such as the Cloth and the like,—i.e. if it were always excluded (differentiated) from these,—then there would be no difference between the Jar and the ‘Sky-flower’; as it would be always differentiated from all other things; and a thing that is always differentiated from all other things can have no other state save that of the ‘sky-flower’, Consequently, one who is not willing to admit the equality of that thing to the ‘sky-flower’, must admit that it is equal (similar) to other entities, in being an entity; hence this general character (commonalty), in the shape of the universal ‘entity’, has to be admitted.

It may be asked—“In what way then is there the Particular?”

The answer is—‘If it were entirely devoid of non-equality, then it could not be regarded as different from those things.—If that same entity, Jar, were devoid of non-equality to other things like the Cloth,—i.e. if it were not non-equal to them,—then the Jar could not be regarded as any thing different from the Cloth, etc., in the form—‘This is Jar, that is Cloth’; just like the specific individuality of things;—and yet, as a matter of fact, it does differ from other things; hence it becomes established that it has the Particular character also.—(1710)

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