The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1698 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1698.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्भावव्यवहारे तु योग्यतायाः प्रसाधने ।
सङ्केतकाले विज्ञातो विद्यतेऽर्थो निदर्शनम् ॥ १६९८ ॥

tadbhāvavyavahāre tu yogyatāyāḥ prasādhane |
saṅketakāle vijñāto vidyate'rtho nidarśanam || 1698 ||

For the proving of the capability of being used (spoken of, regarded) as such,—there is the example of the thing cognised at the time of the convention.—(1698)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be argued that—“what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 1698 above]

Tadbhāvavyavahāra’—is the ‘vyavahāra’, usage,—of the ‘bhāva’, character, of ‘cause and effect’ and ‘non-existence—That is, what is meant to be proved is the capacity of being spoken of as expressed by a certain name.—[And in tills way, the two Means of Cognition become included under Inference]—The arguments being formulated as follows:—

(A) Things that, by their nature, are perceived after the operation of a certain thing, are capable of being spoken of as the ‘effect’ of that thing,—e.g. the things perceived at the time of Convention; the Jar is found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Potter; so also Words are found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Palate and other portions of the Mouth;—this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.

(B) Similarly in the case of ‘Non-apprehension’, if usage is what is meant to be proved, then the Inferential Reasoning may be formulated as follows:—When certain things capable of being apprehended are not apprehended in certain places, they are to be spoken of as non-existent in those places;—e.g. the Head of the Hare is one that can be spoken of as a place where the Horn is non-existent;—and as regards the doctrine of ‘Universals’, it is found that the ‘Universal’ and other categories postulated by others, which are held to be perceptible, are not perceived at all in individuals—like the spotted Cow for instance,—which are supposed to be the substratum of the said ‘Universal’; so that here ‘Non-apprehension’ is in the very nature of these things. As regards the Individuals,—the spotted and other cows—these are duly perceived, hence these are not rejected as non-existent:

Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the idea that there is only manifestation (by the Cause, of what already exists) is going to be rejected.

It is only on the basis of these facts that things are spoken of as ‘nonexistent

Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Contradictory’, as it is actually present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(1698)

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