The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1628-1629 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1628-1629.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नन्वसम्बद्धगम्यत्वे किमन्यस्यापि नो गतिः ।
नहि सम्बन्धशून्यत्वे विशेषः कश्चनेक्ष्यते ॥ १६२८ ॥
सम्बन्धादेव मानत्वमध्यक्षेऽपि व्यवस्थितम् ।
संवादो हि प्रमाणत्वं स चार्थादात्मलाभतः ॥ १६२९ ॥

nanvasambaddhagamyatve kimanyasyāpi no gatiḥ |
nahi sambandhaśūnyatve viśeṣaḥ kaścanekṣyate || 1628 ||
sambandhādeva mānatvamadhyakṣe'pi vyavasthitam |
saṃvādo hi pramāṇatvaṃ sa cārthādātmalābhataḥ || 1629 ||

If something unrelated could be cognised,—then why should not there be cognition of other things also? Because in the matter of being unrelated, no distinction among things can be perceived. In the case of perception also, validity rests upon relationship only. The validity of a cognition consists in its being in conformity (with the real state of things), and this conformity depends upon the perception owing its existence to the thing perceived,—(1628-1629)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If an unrelated thing could be cognised, then there would be an incongruity,—because there could, in that case, be no distinction between one thing and another,—the absence of relationship being equally present in all things. You have not given any answer to this contention of ours.

As for the question—How is there validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship?—it is irrelevant; because no one regards Perception to be valid, in the absence of a Relationship. In fact, even in Perception, validity rests upon Relationship only.

The reason for this is pointed out—‘The validity of a cognition, etc. etc.’—‘Validity’ consists in conformity, which is the capacity to get at the real thing; and how could this conformity be unreservedly admitted in the case of Perception, if it did not derive its own existence from the thing perceived?—(1628-1629)

The following Text explains what would be wrong if it were otherwise:—[see verse 1630 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: