Verse 1613-1614

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

जलादिव्यतिरिक्तो हि प्रत्यक्षः पावकः क्षमः ।
दाहादौ तत्किमन्येन सामर्थ्येन प्रयोजनम् ॥ १६१३ ॥
नैकान्तेन विभिन्ना चेच्छक्तिः साऽप्युभयात्मिका ।
न विरोधाद्भवेत्सा च प्रत्यक्षाऽनन्यताऽपि यत् ॥ १६१४ ॥

jalādivyatirikto hi pratyakṣaḥ pāvakaḥ kṣamaḥ |
dāhādau tatkimanyena sāmarthyena prayojanam || 1613 ||
naikāntena vibhinnā cecchaktiḥ sā'pyubhayātmikā |
na virodhādbhavetsā ca pratyakṣā'nanyatā'pi yat || 1614 ||

Fire, as apart from water and other things, is clearly perceived as capable of burning; what then is the use of the said ‘potency’?—(1613)

If it be urged that—“the potency is not something absolutely different (from the thing),—it is of a dual character, being both (different and non-different)”,—then (the answer is that) it cannot be so, because of self-contradiction. and further, its non-difference (from the thing) would be cognised by perception.—(1614)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1613]:

Fire, as apart from Water and other things, is clearly perceived as capable of burning; what then is the use of the said ‘Potency’?—(1613)

[verse 1614]:

The following might be urged:—“The objection urged would apply if we held that the Potency is something absolutely different from the Thing; as a matter of fact, however, we regard it to be of a dual character, being both different and non-different”.

This cannot be right.—“Why?”—Because of self-contradiction;—if it, is different, how could it be non-different at the same time? If it is non-different, how could it be different? There is clear self-contradiction if two mutually exclusive properties—the presence of one of which must mean the absence of the other and vice versa,—are attributed to the same thing.—In fact, being another consists in not being the same, as is found in the case of ‘another self’,

Granting that the Potency has the dual character,—even so, that Potency of the dual character is cognisable by Perception itself; because the non-difference of the Potency from the Thing is also cognised by Perception,—and not absolute difference only; whereby it would not be perceptible. Under the circumstances, the statement that ‘Potency is always cognisable from the effect’ would become set aside.—(1614)