The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1593-1598 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1593-1598.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न रात्र्यादिपदार्थश्च दिवावाक्ये च गम्यते ।
न दिवादिपदार्थानां संसर्गो रात्रिभोजने ॥ १५९३ ॥
न भेदो येन तद्वाक्यं तस्य स्यात्प्रतिपादकम् ।
अन्यार्थव्यापृतत्वाच्च न द्वितीयार्थकल्पना ॥ १५९४ ॥
तस्माद्वाक्यान्तरेणायं बुद्धिस्थेन प्रतीयते ।
तेनानागामिकत्वेऽपि यत्तद्वाक्यं प्रतीयते ॥ १५९५ ॥
प्रमाणं तस्य वक्तव्यं प्रत्यक्षादिषु यद्भवेत् ।
नत्वनुच्चरिते वाक्ये प्रत्यक्षं तावदिष्यते ॥ १५९६ ॥
नानुमानं नहीदं हि दृष्टं तेनदृष्टान्तेन सह क्वचित् ।
यदि त्वनुपलब्धेपि सम्बन्धे लिङ्गतेष्यते ॥ १५९७ ॥
तदुच्चारणमात्रेण सर्ववाक्यगतिर्भवेत् ।
सम्बन्धरहितत्वेन नान्यतस्तद्विशिष्यते ॥ १५९८ ॥

na rātryādipadārthaśca divāvākye ca gamyate |
na divādipadārthānāṃ saṃsargo rātribhojane || 1593 ||
na bhedo yena tadvākyaṃ tasya syātpratipādakam |
anyārthavyāpṛtatvācca na dvitīyārthakalpanā || 1594 ||
tasmādvākyāntareṇāyaṃ buddhisthena pratīyate |
tenānāgāmikatve'pi yattadvākyaṃ pratīyate || 1595 ||
pramāṇaṃ tasya vaktavyaṃ pratyakṣādiṣu yadbhavet |
natvanuccarite vākye pratyakṣaṃ tāvadiṣyate || 1596 ||
nānumānaṃ nahīdaṃ hi dṛṣṭaṃ tenadṛṣṭāntena saha kvacit |
yadi tvanupalabdhepi sambandhe liṅgateṣyate || 1597 ||
taduccāraṇamātreṇa sarvavākyagatirbhavet |
sambandharahitatvena nānyatastadviśiṣyate || 1598 ||

“As a matter of fact, the idea of the night (and the man eating at night) cannot be derived from the sentence speaking of the day (and the man not eating); because what is expressed by the words of the latter has no connection with eating at night. Nor is there any contradistinction whereby the latter could indicate the eating at night.—Nor can a second (and totally different) meaning be attributed to the words (speaking of the day); because these are already taken up in expressing another idea.—From all this it follows that the idea in question (of eating at night) is derived from a totally different sentence present only in the mind of the person.—Thus then, this sentence (in the mind), though it is not actually verbally expressed, is yet duly cognised,—and it has to be pointed out which one among the means of cognition, perception and the rest, it is which brings about the cognition of the said (unspoken) sentence.—As the sentence is not actually spoken, it could not be perception; nor could it be inference, because the sentence has never been found to be concomitant with the other factor; and if, even when this relation (of concomitance) has never been perceived, the factor concerned were regarded as an inferential indicative,—then the utterance of any one sentence might bring about the cognition of all sentences; because on the point of being unrelated, there would be no distinction between one sentence and another.”—(1593-1598)—[Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 56-61.]

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged:—‘The idea that the Man eats at night is derived from the said words—He is corpulent and eats not during the day themselves [so that it is only a case of Verbal Cognition].’

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1593-1598 above]

There are two kinds of meaning possible in a sentence—in the form of (a) Connection and (b) Contradistinction; of these ‘Connection’ consists in the unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like Milk and Water, and ‘Contradistinction’ consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of excluder and excluded;—or ‘Connection’ consists in the well-known relation of cause and affect,—and ‘Contradistinction’ in the exclusion of the unlike.—In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence ‘He eats at night’ be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence ‘He eats not in the day For instance, the words of the sentence ‘He eats not in the day’ denote the Day and so forth; and these have no ‘Connection’ with eating at night; as the two are entirely different. Nor is there ‘Contradistinction’ between them; because the word ‘day’ is never used in the sense of the negation of non-night.

It might be argued that—“That he eats at night is another meaning of the same sentence ‘He eats not in the day’.”

The answer to this is—‘Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc.’—There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence,—as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the man not eating in the day and hence cannot express the other idea that he eats at night, Consequently the idea of the man eating at night must be expressed by another sentence.

Present in the mind’—This shows that the cognition is not Verbal.

Though it is not verbally expressed’,—i.e. even though it is not Verbal, due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be verbal cognition.

For the cognition, then, of the sentence—‘He eats at night’—which is understood (in the Mind), some ‘Means’ will have to be pointed out; which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.—And yet it cannot be any of these. Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition,—This is what is meant.

The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rest is next refuted—‘As the sentence, etc. etc.’—The sentence expressing the idea of the man eating at night, not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not heard. Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance). For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of eating at night has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of not-eating in the day,—which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two. Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.

It might be argued that, “even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative”.

The answer to that is—‘And if, even when. etc. etc.’—That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicative even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man not-eating in the day, there should follow the cognition of all sentences,—not only of the sentence speaking of eating at night.—Why?—Because, as regards being devoid of relation, the sentence speaking of eating at night does not differ from any other sentence; that is, in the point of being not-related, all sentences stand on the same footing,—(1593-1598)

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