Verse 1588-1589

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तत्र प्रत्यक्षतो ज्ञाताद्दाहाद्दहनशक्तिता ।
वह्नेरनुमितात्सूर्ये यानात्तच्छक्तियोगिता ॥ १५८८ ॥
शक्तयः सर्वभावानां कार्यार्थापत्तिसाधनाः ।
अपूर्वास्ताश्च गम्यन्ते सम्बन्धग्रहणादृते ॥ १५८९ ॥

tatra pratyakṣato jñātāddāhāddahanaśaktitā |
vahneranumitātsūrye yānāttacchaktiyogitā || 1588 ||
śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ |
apūrvāstāśca gamyante sambandhagrahaṇādṛte || 1589 ||

“For example—(1) the assumption of the burning power of fire, based upon the perceived pact of its haying burnt a certain thing;—(2) the assumption of the mobility of the sun based upon the inferred fact of its going from place to place.—[Ślokavārtika—presumption, 3];—(3) the potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of the effects produced by them; [Ślokavārtika—śūnya, 254]; and all such potencies that become cognised are such as have not been known already,—and these are cognised without any idea of the relation (of concomitance).”—(1588-1589)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following Texts, examples are set forth, in order, of Presumption based upon the six Means of Cognition:—[see verses 1588-1589 above]

(1) An example of Presumption based upon Perception is the following—Having perceived the fact of burning by Fire, there is Presumption of the presence of Burning Power of Fire.

(2) An example of Presumption based upon Inference is the following—When the fact of the Sun’s moving from place to place has been inferred, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of mobility in the Sun.

(3) The potencies of all things are always presumed on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them. This Presumption (of Potencies) itself is based sometimes on Perception; e.g. when one perceives the effect and thence presumes the potency in the Cause;—when however the effect is known through Inference or some other means of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is presumedl, then the Presumption is based upon Inference or some other Means of Cognition.

The compound ‘Kāryārthāpatti, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘those whose cognition is brought about by the otherwise inexplicability of the effect;—(he. the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies)’.

It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known; because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known; so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended; and hence this must be regarded as a Form of Valid Cognition.

It might be argued that—‘Potencies are always inferred from the effects,—they are not presumed’.

The answer to this is that the cognitions in question are brought about without any idea of the relation (of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference); hence they cannot be regarded as Inference.—(1588-1589)

The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the Relation:—[see verse 1590 next]