Verse 1578-1580

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न सम्बन्ध्यतिरिक्तश्च सम्बन्धोऽस्तीति साधितम् ।
प्रागेव समये शब्दो गृहीतः श्रोत्रचेतसा ॥ १५७८ ॥
चक्षुषा दृश्यते चासावग्रतोऽवस्थितः पशुः ।
पृथग्विज्ञातयोरेषा युक्ता न घटना प्रमा ॥ १५७९ ॥
गृहीतप्रतिसन्धानात्सुगन्धिमधुरत्ववत् ।
तन्नामयोगसंवित्तिः स्मार्त्ततां नातिवर्त्तते ॥ १५८० ॥

na sambandhyatiriktaśca sambandho'stīti sādhitam |
prāgeva samaye śabdo gṛhītaḥ śrotracetasā || 1578 ||
cakṣuṣā dṛśyate cāsāvagrato'vasthitaḥ paśuḥ |
pṛthagvijñātayoreṣā yuktā na ghaṭanā pramā || 1579 ||
gṛhītapratisandhānātsugandhimadhuratvavat |
tannāmayogasaṃvittiḥ smārttatāṃ nātivarttate || 1580 ||

It has been proved that the relation has no existence apart from the relatives;—on the previous occasion, at the time of the convention, the name was perceived by auditory perception;—and later on the animal standing before the man is seen with the eye;—apart from these two already thus cognised, any mingling up of the two could not be valid cognition. Because any other cognition could only recapitulate what has been already cognised; as in the case of the notions of ‘fragrant’ and ‘sweet—thus the notion of the connection of the name cannot escape prom being op' the nature of remembrance.—(1578-1580)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

So far, it has been taken for granted (for the sake of argument) that the ‘relation between the Name and the thing Named’ forms the object of Analogical Cognition,—and then it has been shown that this Analogical Cognition cannot be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition,—(1) because it apprehends what is already apprehended (which fact makes it invalid), and (2) because it is included under ‘Inference’,—Now what the Author proceeds to show is as follows;—the Relation can have no existence apart from the Relatives;—and the two Relatives in question (the Name and the Named) have both been apprehended by other Means of Cognition; for instance, at the time of the communication of the Convention, the Name was apprehended by Auditory Perception, and later on the Gavaya standing before the man is apprehended by Visual Perception; under the circumstances, what else is there to be known, for knowing which Analogy would serve as the Means of Cognition?—[see verses 1578-1580 above]

What is meant is that the Cognition in question cannot be valid, as it apprehends what has been already apprehended.

‘It has been proved’—in course of our examination of the Category of Quality.

The following might be urged:—“The two Relatives may have been cognised by auditory and other perceptions; it is the commingling of the two that is done by Analogical Cognition; and it is in this commingling that lies the validity of Analogical Cognition

The answer to this is—‘Apart from these two, etc. etc.’

‘As in the case of the notions, etc. etc.’—The affix ‘vati’ has the force of the Locative. The sense is that there are such notions as—‘This thing that I have perceived is fragrant and sweet’, where there is a commingling of things already apprehended,—which are not regarded as valid; so would, the Cognition in Question also be.

‘Tat’—Thus, therefore.

‘Nāmayoga, etc.’—the cognition of the connection of the Name.

‘Can escape, etc. etc.’—as already explained.—(1578-1580)