Verse 1571-1573

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नहि चित्राङ्गदे कश्चित्तन्नामग्रहणे सति ।
कालान्तरेण तं शब्दं वेत्ति चारुकिरीटिनि ॥ १५७१ ॥
तस्मात्प्राग् यत्र तेनेदं विकल्पप्रतिबिम्बके ।
ज्ञातं नाम बहिर्बुद्ध्या सामान्यमिति संज्ञिते ॥ १५७२ ॥
गवयस्योपलम्भेऽपि तत्रैव प्रतिपद्यते ।
दृश्यकल्पाविभागज्ञो बाह्य इत्यभिमन्यते ॥ १५७३ ॥

nahi citrāṅgade kaścittannāmagrahaṇe sati |
kālāntareṇa taṃ śabdaṃ vetti cārukirīṭini || 1571 ||
tasmātprāg yatra tenedaṃ vikalpapratibimbake |
jñātaṃ nāma bahirbuddhyā sāmānyamiti saṃjñite || 1572 ||
gavayasyopalambhe'pi tatraiva pratipadyate |
dṛśyakalpāvibhāgajño bāhya ityabhimanyate || 1573 ||

When a man has recognised a certain name as applying to the man with the wonderful armlet, he does not, at another time, recognise it as applying to the man with the beautiful diadem.—For these reasons, when a man has come to know of a name as applying to a certain conceptual image recognised as something external, and called the ‘universal’,—then, even if he comes to perceive the oavaya, he must recognise it as applying to the gavaya itself; and it is only one who is ignorant of the distinction between the ‘perceptible’ and the ‘conceptual’ that regards it as ‘external—(1571-1573)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Aṅgada’ is an ornament called ‘Kaṭaka’, Armlet.

‘Cītrāṅgada’—is the man who is wearing a ‘citra’—wonderful—‘aṅgada’—armlet.

When the man with the wonderful armlet has been once spoken of as ‘Devadatta’ (by name)—in the statement ‘The man with the wonderful armlet is Devadatta’,—and one, on hearing this, has cognised the name as belonging to that person,—he does not, at any future time, recognise that expression ‘man with the wonderful bracelet’ as applying to Yajñadatta, who is a ‘man with the beautiful diadem’.

‘Kirīṭa’ is diadem;—‘Cārukirīṭa’ is the man with the beautiful diadem. For the above reasons, in order to avoid the likelihood of the incongruity, when a Name has been recognised by a determinate cognition envisaging an external object, as applicable to a conceptually imposed object,—then, if he comes to perceive the Gavaya, he recognises that name as applied to that same conceptually imposed object,—and not to the external Specific Individuality of the name of ‘Gavaya’; and the same conceptual Image is what is spoken of as the ‘Universal—And this is purely imaginary, as it has been discarded above.

Question:—“How then is there the idea of the external Specific Individuality?”

Answer:—‘It is only one, etc. etc.’—(1571-1573)