The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1559-1560 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1559-1560.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

गवयस्योपलम्भे च तुरङ्गादौ प्रवर्त्तते ।
तद्वैसादृश्यविज्ञानं यत्तदन्या प्रमा न किम् ॥ १५५९ ॥
अभावान्तर्गतं नो चेन्नैवं भावावलम्बनात् ।
अन्योन्याभावतायां वा समं सादृश्यबुद्धिषु ॥ १५६० ॥

gavayasyopalambhe ca turaṅgādau pravarttate |
tadvaisādṛśyavijñānaṃ yattadanyā pramā na kim || 1559 ||
abhāvāntargataṃ no cennaivaṃ bhāvāvalambanāt |
anyonyābhāvatāyāṃ vā samaṃ sādṛśyabuddhiṣu || 1560 ||

When one sees the gavaya, there appears the notion of its ‘dissimilarity’ to the horse and other animals; why cannot this be a distinct form of cognition?—If it be urged that “it cannot be so regarded because it is included under negation”,—then, the same might be said in regard to the notions of ‘similarity’ which also are included under ‘mutual negation’.—(1559-1560)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Then, again, on seeing the Gavaya, there appears the idea of its similarity in the Cow,—and this is regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition; in the same way, when on seeing the Gavaya, there follows the notion of its dissimilarity in the Horse,—why cannot this also be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition?

“It cannot be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition, as it is included under Negation.”

That cannot be right.

“Why?”

Because it envisages a positive entity; while Negation envisages a non-entity.

Dissimilarity is only negation of similarity; and hence the notion of dissimilarity is really included under Negation.”

The same might be said, etc. etc.’—That is to say, if the negative character of a certain object is sought to be based upon its being subject to Mutual Negation,—then the same sort of object is found in the case of the notions of Similarity also,—which are regarded as ‘Analogical Cognition—(1559-1560)

Question:—“How so?”

Answer:—[see verse 1561 next]

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